

Douglas J. Amy

This is Exhibit C to the affidavit of
Douglas Amy, Sworn before me this
day of April, 2001

Notary Public

Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Hamshire, S.S. Date *4/13/01*
Then personally appeared the above named
DOUGLAS J. AMY
and acknowledge the foregoing instrument
to be h free act and deed, before me,
Margaret A. [Signature] Notary Public

[Signature]

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES
JANUARY 17, 2008

**ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
AND REPRESENTATIVE LEGISLATURES:
CONSIDERATION OF
ALTERNATIVE ELECTORAL SYSTEMS**

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The paper examines several kinds of electoral systems in order to determine which are the most likely to achieve a "representative outcome" — in other words, to elect a parliament which, in its membership, mirrors the demographic composition of Canadian society in terms of gender, race, and other politically-relevant characteristics.

In 1991, the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing reported to the federal government. Although some of the Commission's recommendations would make the electoral system more accessible to women, the Royal Commission did not recommend the types of reform that would lead to a substantially greater representation of women in the electoral system.

In October 1993, Canadians elected a new government. The CACSW recommends that the current government re-examine the issue of electoral reform, and consider the system of proportional representation.

The CACSW commissioned this background paper to begin a large-scale discussion and consultative process on ways to increase the representation of women in the electoral system. We hope that the paper will be read by Members of Parliament, policy-makers, women's groups, and all those interested in improving the electoral system so that it truly represents the full spectrum of the Canadian population.

Although electoral systems seldom guarantee representative outcomes, they do significantly affect the potential for such outcomes. Electoral systems constrain or facilitate the efforts of political parties to select candidates who reflect the composition of the electorate.

When political parties are committed to achieving representative outcomes, when general social conditions encourage women's active participation in electoral politics, and when there are few formal or informal barriers to the entry of women and other marginalized groups into

formal politics, international experience suggests that proportional representation (PR) systems pose fewer barriers to achieving representative outcomes than do single-member systems. Among West European and North American countries, the countries with the highest proportion of women in their legislatures — Finland, Norway, and Sweden — use PR electoral systems, while the countries with a lower proportion of women — the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada — use single-member systems.

Under single-member electoral systems, the country is divided up into electoral districts represented by one member of the legislature. Single-member systems are used in elections for the Canadian House of Commons, the British House of Commons, the United States House of Representatives and the Senate, the Australian House of Representatives, and the French National Assembly, among others.

Single-member systems present several barriers to achieving representative outcomes:

- * Because each party nominates only one candidate in each electoral district, there is no opportunity for "ticket balancing", or ensuring that members of relevant groups are among the party's candidates.
- * Because nomination practices tend to be highly decentralized in single-member systems, it is difficult for parties to impose affirmative action measures to ensure that members of underrepresented groups are nominated, particularly in districts where the party is likely to win.
- * The logic of a single-member system requires that the party nominate the most appealing (or least offensive) candidate. Consequently, party members may believe they are taking an electoral risk if they deviate from the norm of the white, male, professional candidate.

PR electoral systems are designed to reflect the electorate's party preferences in the legislature. Under PR systems, several people are elected from a party list to represent a large geographic district. PR systems are employed in most West European countries (except France and the United Kingdom).

PR systems are more likely to achieve representative outcomes than are single-member systems for the following reasons:

- * Because parties nominate lists of candidates in each district, they are able to engage in "ticket balancing".
- * Parties face pressure to engage in ticket balancing because of the transparency of lists: it is immediately evident to voters when parties are not nominating representative lists or when parties are placing members of marginalized groups at the bottom of their lists.
- * The use of party lists makes it much easier for parties to employ affirmative action provisions in candidate selection procedures. For example, several European countries require that male and female candidates alternate positions on the party's list.

There are two categories of PR systems: single transferable vote (STV) and simple list systems. In a list system, the party draws up a list of candidates in order of preference. Once the party's proportion of the popular vote has been counted, candidates are elected from the top of the list. In an STV system, parties draw up lists of candidates, but voters rank the candidates in order of preference. List systems give parties control over which candidates on the list will be elected, while STV systems give voters control over which candidates will be elected.

Consequently, list systems are more favourable to achieving representative outcomes when parties are committed to achieving representative outcomes. STV systems are preferable when voters are more committed than are parties to achieving representative outcomes.

Assuming that Canadian parties are in fact committed to electing representative legislatures, a list PR system would be the most effective means of achieving this end. Ideally, a list PR system would operate with each electoral district electing at least six MPs. This would decrease the probability that a party would elect only one person in a district. When a party expects to elect only one candidate in a district, the nomination contest becomes a "winner takes all" event, thereby making ticket balancing purely cosmetic.

The benefits of PR systems are not limited to facilitating representative outcomes. These electoral systems also translate voters' preferences into legislative outcomes more accurately than do single-member systems. Moreover, PR systems encourage the development of party systems that offer voters a wider array of choice. Various measures can be adopted to mitigate the instability often associated with PR systems.

Adopting a PR system would not guarantee that the Canadian Parliament would be more representative of Canadian society in terms of gender, race, and other relevant characteristics. It would, however, make it significantly easier for political parties to fulfil their commitments to nominate candidates who better represent the diversity of Canadian society.

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INTRODUCTION

Electoral systems establish the "rules of the game" for political contests. For the most part, these rules appear to be neutral. Upon closer examination, however, it is apparent that Canada's electoral rules are not neutral toward women. In comparison to a proportional representation system, Canada's single-member plurality electoral system is much less favourable to the entry of women into the political system. The purpose of this paper is to review the aspects of Canada's single-member plurality electoral system that work against the election of women and to consider the potential of other electoral systems to achieve outcomes that reflect the diversity of Canadian society.

Defining a "Representative Outcome"

Politicians, political theorists, and political scientists have many different ideas of what constitutes a "representative outcome" to an election. A common focus is on how well the electoral system represents public opinion, i.e., how well it translates voters' preferences among political parties into legislative seats for those parties.

An additional, and frequently overlooked, aspect of representation is the descriptive, or mirror, concept of representation. This concept rests upon the premise that democracy is better served when the composition of the legislature closely mirrors, in terms of social characteristics, the composition of the population represented. This conception holds a strong appeal, particularly for groups that have been underrepresented in legislatures.

Many mainstream commentators dismiss this concept of representation. They argue that the only way of mirroring the true complexity of society would be to have all individuals represent themselves.¹ At the same time, these commentators accept with equanimity the prevailing pattern of political representation wherein elected officials tend to be drawn from a relatively narrow and privileged stratum of society: white, able-bodied men, often with business or professional backgrounds.

To insist upon the validity of the descriptive conception of representation is to assert that women, members of racial minority groups, Aboriginal peoples, persons with disabilities, and other "minority" groups have distinct political interests and a legitimate stake in the political sphere. Until recently, this would have been seen as a radical claim. However, with the rise of new social movements in the past thirty years, the social dimension of political representation has been clearly articulated and has come to compete with older understandings of political representation.

For the purpose of this paper, then, a representative outcome will be understood as an outcome that mirrors the composition of the society so far as possible. Applying this definition, it is readily apparent that Canadian legislatures are far from representative; women, racial minorities, people with disabilities, young people, and non-professionals are all significantly underrepresented.² This is also the case, to varying degrees, in legislatures elsewhere. Although it is unlikely that any electoral outcome could provide a perfect mirror for society, reproducing every politically-relevant aspect of identity, it certainly is possible that electoral outcomes could be significantly more representative than our current legislatures.

WHY ELECTORAL SYSTEMS MATTER

As noted above, electoral systems establish the basic "rules of the game" for electoral politics. The type of electoral system used determines whether one person will be elected to represent a relatively limited geographic constituency, or whether several people will be elected to represent a larger constituency — perhaps even as large as the entire country. The electoral system also determines whether electors will vote for a candidate or will vote directly for a party. Although these issues may seem esoteric, the electoral system can shape outcomes and is therefore crucial to groups and individuals with a stake in gaining representation in the political system.

Who Is Represented

All modern societies are characterized by multiple social cleavages: differences among citizens along racial, linguistic, religious, regional, class, or gender lines. Each citizen's political identity is defined, at least in part, in terms of these social cleavages. Although all citizens have multiple potential political identities, the electoral system plays a role in determining which aspects of political identity find expression within the political system.

Canada's existing electoral system (the single-member plurality or "first-past-the-post" system) gives top priority to geographic or regional aspects of citizens' political identity. Because it organizes the Canadian electorate into constituencies of people who live in bounded geographic areas, the single-member system conceives of voters as individuals whose primary political identity stems from their membership in geographically-based communities. The original intent of the British Westminster system (on which the Canadian system is based) was to represent geographic communities, with the members of the House of Commons (or communes, originally) representing the communities that comprised the country.

It is possible to conceive of electoral arrangements that recognize the salience of non-geographic aspects of political identity, and guarantee representation of these aspects. For example, the 1991 report of the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing recommended a system of separate seats for Aboriginal people in the Canadian House of Commons, based partially on a system operating in New Zealand.³

It is helpful to recall that during and prior to the eighteenth century, representation was frequently based on one's place in society. Parliaments were composed of representatives of various "estates" of society: the aristocracy, the clergy, and the commoners. The British bicameral system is a remnant of this type of representation, with the House of Commons representing the common people and the House of Lords representing the aristocracy.

Compared to single-member systems, electoral systems that use proportional representation (PR) tend to be more flexible in the range of characteristics they bring into

electoral politics. The geographic dimension of the elector's political identity does not necessarily dominate all other dimensions. In fact, PR systems can facilitate the representation of groups which are not geographically organized.

PR systems allow parties to select several candidates to represent a larger geographic area. As a result, parties are able to accommodate and represent non-geographic aspects of political identity. Within the context of a PR system, parties can choose to make gender, race, ability, age, occupation, or any other characteristic a relevant criterion for seeking the support of electors. To achieve this, parties engage in a practice known as "ticket balancing" which involves ensuring that there are members of relevant groups on the party's electoral list.

How Electoral Systems Shape Outcomes

Few voters are aware of the extent to which, at a practical level, electoral systems shape electoral outcomes. It is important to note that electoral systems seldom try to guarantee fully representative outcomes. To be sure, the Canadian electoral system does guarantee that the composition of the House of Commons will be roughly representative of the regional composition of the country. Similarly, systems of separate seats for Aboriginal people or racial minorities guarantee roughly proportional representation of those groups.

Although electoral systems seldom aspire to guarantee representative outcomes (with the exceptions noted above), they do significantly affect the potential for such outcomes by constraining or facilitating parties' efforts to mirror the electorate's demographic composition. This dynamic is most easily demonstrated in the case of gender, since the proportion of men and women are roughly equal in all societies. A study of factors (including electoral structures, political parties, and socio-economic conditions) contributing to the election of women in 23 democracies found that the type of electoral system is the most significant predictor of the number of women elected.⁴ In general, systems in which one person represents one constituency (single-member systems) are less likely to yield representative outcomes than systems in which several people represent a larger constituency (PR or dual/multi-member systems). This is illustrated in Table 1.

Table I: Women as Proportion of National Legislators

| Electoral System | Country (Year of Election) | House | Women (as %) |
|--|----------------------------|-------------------|--------------|
| Single-Member Plurality | New Zealand (1993) | House of Reps. | 21.2% |
| | Canada (1993) | House of Commons | 18.3% |
| | United States (1992) | House of Reps. | 10.3% |
| | United Kingdom (1992) | House of Commons | 9.2% |
| | United States (1992) | Senate | 6.0% |
| Single-Member Majority | Australia (1993) | House of Reps. | 8.2% |
| | France (1993) | National Assembly | 6.1% |
| Proportional Representation (List) | Norway (1993) | | 39.4% |
| | Finland (1991) | | 39.0% |
| | Sweden (1991) | | 33.5% |
| | Denmark (1990) | | 33.0% |
| | Iceland (1991) | | 23.8% |
| | Italy (1992) | | 8.1% |
| Proportional Representation (Single Transferable Vote) | Ireland (1992) | Dail | 12.1% |
| | Australia (1993) | Senate | 8.2% |
| PR/Single-Member Mixed | Germany (1990) | Bundestag | 20.5% |

Sources:

New Zealand; Norway: Letter from Inter-Parliamentary Union to Josée Lescot, Documentation Centre, Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, April 13, 1994.

Canada: *Globe and Mail*, October 27, 1993, p. A17.

United States: *Washington Post*, November 5, 1992, p. A33.

United Kingdom: Pippa Norris, Elizabeth Vallance, and Joni Lovenduski, "Do Candidates Make a Difference? Gender, Race, Ideology and Incumbency", *Parliamentary Affairs*, vol. 45, no. 4 (October 1992).

Australia; France; Italy; Sweden: *Women in Parliament* [poster] (Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1993); *Statesman's Year Book: statistical and historical annual of the states of the world, 1993-94* (London: Macmillan, 1993).

Finland: *Women in Parliament* [poster] (Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1993); Paula Snyder, *The European Women's Almanac* (London: Scarlet Press, 1992).

Denmark; Germany: Paula Snyder, *The European Women's Almanac* (London: Scarlet Press, 1992).

Iceland: Paula Snyder, *The European Women's Almanac* (London: Scarlet Press, 1992); *Statesman's Year Book: statistical and historical annual of the states of the world, 1993-94* (London: Macmillan, 1993).

Ireland: *Women in Parliament* [poster] (Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1993).

This does not mean that PR or dual-member systems will guarantee representative outcomes or that single-member systems are incapable of producing representative outcomes. Rather, under favourable conditions, PR systems pose fewer barriers to achieving representative outcomes than do single-member systems. "Favourable conditions" in this context include: (a) political parties committed to achieving representative outcomes; (b) candidate nomination or selection procedures that institutionalize the party's commitment to achieving representative outcomes; (c) general social and intellectual conditions that encourage women's active participation in electoral politics; and (d) an absence of informal barriers to women's participation in party politics.

Essentially, some electoral systems lend themselves more readily to achieving representative outcomes than do others. Under ideal conditions, a party that is committed to achieving a representative outcome will face fewer institutional barriers under a PR system than under a single-member system. However, the absence of institutional barriers does not guarantee representative outcomes. Legislatures in countries employing PR systems were highly unrepresentative until women in these countries demanded that political parties include them on their lists.

SINGLE-MEMBER SYSTEMS

Plurality Systems

Single-member plurality (SMP) electoral systems are found in most English-speaking countries, including Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand.⁵ In a SMP system, the country is divided into electoral districts, each of which elect one member. To win, a candidate does not need to win a majority (more than half) of the votes in the election. Rather, the successful candidate needs only to win more votes than any other candidate (a plurality of votes). In other words, the candidate who is "first past the post" wins the election.

The primary value attributed to the SMP system is its ability to produce stable majority governments in a parliamentary system. Because a candidate needs only to win a plurality of the vote to be elected, it is possible for a party to win a majority of seats in the legislature without winning a majority of the popular vote when there are more than two parties contesting an election, as is frequently the case in Canada. Under these circumstances, the SMP system can transform the party with the largest minority of the popular vote into one with an overall majority of seats in the legislature.⁶ This is illustrated by the results of the Canadian general elections of 1988 and 1993 (see Table II). This tendency of SMP systems to distort the popular will is often seen as an acceptable trade-off because of the value placed on the formation of stable, majority governments in Canada and in other countries that use single-member systems.

**Table II:
Results of the 1988 and 1993 Canadian General Elections**

| Party | Popular Vote (% of total) | Seats in House of Commons (% of total) |
|-------------|------------------------------|--|
| 1988 | | |
| PC | 43% | 57% |
| Liberal | 32% | 28% |
| NDP | 20% | 15% |
| Other | 4% | 0% |
| 1993 | | |
| PC | 16% | 1% |
| Liberal | 41% | 60% |
| NDP | 7% | 3% |
| Reform | 19% | 18% |
| BQ | 14% | 18% |
| Other | 3% | 0% |

Source: Alan Frizzell, Jon Pammett, and Anthony Westell, *The Canadian General Election of 1988* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1989); *Globe and Mail*, October 27, 1993.

The second attribute of the SMP system which Canadians have historically valued is the direct representative relationship that it creates between a legislator and citizens in a discrete geographic area. The local Member of Parliament acts as a point of contact between citizens and the government on matters ranging from major issues of public policy to individual problems with taxes, immigration, and pensions. Voters can, at least in theory, hold the individual Member of Parliament accountable through the electoral process.

A third positive attribute of the SMP electoral system is the considerable scope it allows voters for judging the merits of individual candidates. This is believed to lead to greater responsiveness to voter preference within the political system.⁷ However, when combined with party discipline in the legislature, this notion of individual accountability loses some of its power because individual Members of Parliament must vote along party lines rather than responding to voter preferences.

Several weaknesses are associated with SMP electoral systems, particularly the distortion of popular will as discussed above and demonstrated in Table II. In essence, voters who vote for the second or third place party in their constituency find that their votes are "wasted" as they do not contribute to the election of any candidate. When these votes are aggregated, the result is the situation depicted in Table II, where the second and third place parties are underrepresented in the House of Commons in relation to their share of the popular vote.⁸

In addition, single-member electoral systems tend to accentuate regional differences in voting. In the 1988 Canadian general election, for example, the New Democratic Party won 14% of the popular vote in Quebec, but won no seats in the province. In the same election, the Progressive Conservative Party won 41% of the vote in Prince Edward Island, but won no seats.⁹ This tendency was also evident in the 1993 Canadian general election. In Ontario, the Reform Party won 20% of the popular vote, but won only 1 of 99 seats. In Alberta, the Progressive Conservative Party won 15% of the popular vote, but won no seats.

Finally, SMP systems tend to restrict the entry of new parties into the political system. For example, a party that consistently won 10% of the popular vote might never win a single seat if its support were spread evenly across the country. The only way that new parties can enter the system is if their support is geographically concentrated. In this sense, the SMP system favours some new parties over others. New parties whose appeal is regional in nature (e.g., the Bloc Québécois) may be able to enter the party system, while parties appealing to a group spread evenly across the country are unlikely to be able to enter the party system.¹⁰

Majority Systems

Single-member majority (SMM) systems, which are used in elections for the Lower Houses in France and Australia, differ from SMP systems only in their requirement that the successful candidate win a majority, rather than just a plurality, of the popular vote in the constituency.

To achieve this, the French system requires two elections. Candidates from all parties are on the ballot in each constituency for the first election. If no candidate wins a majority of votes in the first election, a second "run-off" election is held between the candidates who secured the votes of at least 12.5% of the registered electorate. In practice, there are usually only two candidates who win enough support in the first election to be placed on the second ballot. With only two candidates running in the second election, a candidate must garner support from a majority of voters in order to win.

In Australia, there is only one election, but voters rank the candidates in order of preference. After voters' first preferences are counted, the candidate with the lowest proportion of the popular vote is dropped from the ballot. All of the ballots that indicated this candidate as the first preference are then redistributed according to their second choice. This procedure is repeated until a candidate receives a majority of votes and is declared elected.

The strengths and weaknesses of the SMM system are similar to those of the SMP system. In fact, because candidates must win the support of a majority of voters, the system's

capacity for producing majority governments and excluding small parties from the system is even stronger than that of the SMP system. As discussed below, the SMP and SMM systems also pose similar barriers to the achievement of representative outcomes.

Potential for Representative Outcomes

Single-member systems, both plurality and majority, are particularly well suited to representing geographically-concentrated groups. If members of a group comprise a significant majority of the voters in an electoral district and choose to unite behind one candidate, they are able to ensure representation of their group. Parties are likely to select candidates from the majority group in order to appeal to the electorate in the district. This characteristic of single-member systems is being recognized increasingly in the United States with "affirmative action" gerrymandering to create electoral districts favourable to the election of Black or Hispanic candidates.

However, single-member systems are favourable neither to the representation of women and other groups not living in geographic concentrations, nor to groups living in a geographic concentration but comprising only a minority of the voters in the electoral district.¹¹ Because women comprise only 52% of the population in any electoral district, their claim for representation is not perceived as being as legitimate as that of a group that comprises 70% or 80% of the population. Because each party chooses only one candidate for each electoral district, there is no opportunity for ticket balancing.

Moreover, single-member systems make nomination contests "winner takes all" events. If a man and a woman compete for a party's nomination, a victory for the woman necessarily means a loss for the man (and vice versa). This situation can be contrasted to PR systems, where there is room for both women and men on the ballot. By selecting a white male professional candidate to stand as their party's sole candidate in a single-member election, the members of a constituency association can claim that they have chosen the "best" candidate for the job. If the majority of constituency associations independently choose similar candidates, it appears coincidental; clearly, there is no deliberate effort to exclude women, racial minorities, non-

professionals, persons with disabilities, and so on. These independent constituency associations do not appear nearly as exclusionary as the party that chooses ten candidates for a party list and excludes members of certain groups. When one organization or body must select several candidates, it has a clear opportunity to achieve gender, racial, or other representation. The same is not true of the constituency association that chooses only one candidate.

In addition, the logic of a single-member system requires that the most appealing (or least offensive) candidate be selected. In such a situation, deviation from the norm of the white, male, professional candidate is noticeable. Again, this can be contrasted to a PR system, where the failure to present a balanced ticket may be commented upon and may limit the party's appeal to some voters.¹²

An example of the difficulties posed by a SMP system is the Canadian New Democratic Party's effort to impose quotas in its nomination practices. The NDP plan involved grouping several constituencies together and requiring half of the constituencies in each group to nominate women. The policy also required a specified number of ridings to nominate candidates who are Aboriginal, members of racial minority groups, or have disabilities.¹³ Before the plan could be implemented, however, the party's governing council decided to back away from mandatory provisions because of protest from constituency associations.¹⁴ Similarly, the Socialist Party in France established a 20% quota for women candidates, but has been unable to achieve this consistently.¹⁵

As noted above, single-member district electoral systems are inhospitable to small and new parties. This is particularly true for women's parties, which generally appeal to only half of the electorate in any district. In this way, single-member electoral systems have contributed to the failure of efforts to create women's parties in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada.¹⁶

From this discussion, it is apparent that single-member electoral systems are unfavourable to representative outcomes. This is also apparent from the record on electing women to national legislatures which use single-member systems. The rate of representation of women in these countries ranges from 18.3% in Canada to 6% in the U.S. Senate. Clearly, if a more representative outcome is desired, other electoral systems merit examination.

MULTI-MEMBER/AT LARGE SYSTEMS

Multi-member or "at large" electoral systems involve electoral districts that elect two or more representatives, and give voters as many votes as there are seats available in the electoral district. In a district with five seats, each voter would be able to vote five times. She could vote for all five candidates proposed by her party of choice, or she could divide her votes among candidates from more than one party. The five candidates who garner the most votes will be elected. This system is used in municipal elections in several cities and towns in the United States and the United Kingdom, and in school board elections in some Canadian jurisdictions.

This system has the advantage of allowing a voter to divide her votes among candidates of more than one party. Thus, the voter does not have to support a candidate she finds unacceptable just because that candidate is on the list of her chosen party.

There are, however, several disadvantages to this system. Like a single-member system, it allows votes to be "wasted" as there is no mechanism for reallocating votes cast for candidates who are not elected. Because votes are wasted, a multi-member system does not guarantee proportional representation of the voters' preferences. As illustrated in Table III below, a party may elect all of its candidates in an electoral district with less than a majority of the popular vote as long as the party's candidates win more votes than any other candidates (a plurality). If two other parties are running and those parties are running full slates, the remainder of the popular vote could be divided among the two other parties' candidates without electing a single one of their candidates.

Table III:
Hypothetical Election Results: Multi-Member Constituency
(100 voters casting 3 votes each)

| Candidate | Party A | Party B | Party C |
|--------------|-----------------------|---------|---------|
| | VOTES RECEIVED | | |
| Candidate #1 | 40 | 35 | 25 |
| Candidate #2 | 40 | 35 | 25 |
| Candidate #3 | 40 | 35 | 25 |

In this scenario, all three of party A's candidates are elected.

Potential for Representative Outcomes

The limited research available on multi-member district systems suggests that these systems are slightly more favourable to the election of women than are single-member systems. A study of multi-member districts at the local and state level in Britain and the United States found that women fare slightly better under this system than in single-member districts.¹⁷ There are two reasons for this.

First, multi-member district systems, like list PR and STV systems, offer potential for ticket balancing. In her study of female candidates in U.S. state-level politics, Susan Carroll found that parties (especially the Democratic Party) were more likely to recruit women as candidates in multi-member districts than in single-member districts.¹⁸

Second, there is a possibility that voters will engage in "affirmative action voting" if they have several votes to distribute among candidates. Although this possible pattern of voting behaviour is not confirmed by any empirical studies, some observers argue that even a small number of voters acting in this way has the potential to affect election results.¹⁹

Although multi-member districts are apparently more favourable to the election of women than are single-member districts, a growing body of research suggests that they are less favourable to the representation of minority groups. In fact, there is an emerging consensus in the United States that the underrepresentation of African Americans and other minorities in local U.S. politics is directly attributable to multi-member electoral arrangements.²⁰

A simple example illustrates the reason for this effect. In a district where the population is 60% white and 40% black, the whites could cast their 60% of the votes for each of the white candidates and sweep the election. Because multi-member systems are "winner takes all" arrangements, no black candidates would be elected in this example.²¹

While it is difficult to generalize about the overall effect of a multi-member system, the evidence from the United States suggests that these systems privilege the representation of women from majority groups while making the representation of women from minority groups even more difficult than it would be under a single-member system. Clearly, this does not come close to achieving a truly representative outcome.

PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION SYSTEMS

Proportional representation (PR) systems are designed to reflect the electorate's party preferences in the composition of the legislature. While single-member systems allow voters to select an individual to represent their community, proportional representation systems allow voters to select the party which best reflects their political preferences. In general, the party composition of the legislature in PR systems roughly reflects the popular vote in the election. While there are numerous varieties of PR systems, they can be classified as list systems and single transferable vote (STV) systems.

Simple List PR Systems

In a simple list PR system, political parties draw up a list of candidates whose names are placed on the ballot. The number of names on the list usually corresponds to the total number of seats available. The list is arranged in order of preference, usually with the party leader first, political "stars" and potential cabinet ministers near the top, and lesser-known candidates nearer the bottom of the list. The positions at the top of the list, known as "mandate positions", are roughly analogous to "safe seats" in a single-member system. Candidates holding positions at the bottom of the list, known as "ornamental positions", are in a situation similar to that of "sacrificial lambs" nominated in constituencies the party is highly unlikely to win in a single-member system.

Under the simple list PR system, voters cast a single ballot for a party list, rather than for a specific candidate. Once the votes are counted, seats are assigned according to the proportion of the popular vote each party has won. This is illustrated in Table IV, for a hypothetical election in which 10 seats are available and three major parties are competing. In this example, the first five candidates on Party A's list would be elected, the first three from Party B's list, and the first two from Party C's list. Because not all outcomes will be as simple as this, there are several different methods of allocating seats under list PR systems (see Appendix).

Table IV:
Hypothetical Election Results in a PR System
for a District with 10 Seats

| Party | Popular Vote (% of total) | Number of Seats |
|--------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------------|
| Party A | 48% | 5 |
| Party B | 31% | 3 |
| Party C | 21% | 2 |

The legislation that establishes the rules of the electoral system in all PR systems sets a "threshold" for party representation. The threshold is the percentage of the popular vote that the party must win in order to have members elected. The lowest threshold is in Israel, where parties need to win only 1% of the popular vote nationally in order to have a member elected. In Germany, negative historical experience with small extremist parties has led to imposition of a high threshold of 5%.

Among the strengths of list PR systems is their ability to reflect the diversity of the electorate's opinion in the legislature. When they translate votes into seats, PR systems distort voters preferences to a much lesser extent than do single-member systems. Under a PR system, a party that does not win a majority of the popular vote does not command a majority of the seats in the legislature. This means that parties must enter into coalitions in order to form governments.

This characteristic of PR systems is sometimes considered a weakness, as coalition governments are generally considered to be less stable than majority governments. Critics of PR point to the instability of coalition governments in Israel and Italy, both employing list PR systems. It must be noted, however, that both the Israeli and the Italian systems have very low thresholds for parties to elect candidates, thereby contributing to the number of parties represented in the legislature.²² In the Nordic and West European countries, higher thresholds for party representation and relatively stable political cultures have meant that PR systems have not led to undue instability.

Unlike single-member systems, PR systems do not "waste" votes. In a single-member system where the winner takes all in each constituency, voters who do not cast a ballot for the winning candidate find that their vote has no impact on the composition of the legislature. In contrast, every vote in a PR system counts because it contributes to the election of a candidate on a party list. The only exception to this occurs when an elector votes for a party that does not garner enough support to elect a single member.

Moreover, PR systems are somewhat more favourable to the entry of new parties into the political system than are single-member systems. While this may increase the potential for instability, it also makes the political system more dynamic and more open to the representation of new social interests. It is unlikely that the environmentalist Green Party in Germany would have enjoyed the electoral success that it has, nor would the Icelandic women's list have been consistently successful in electing feminists to the Icelandic legislature, if these countries used single-member systems.

Finally, it is important to note that, unlike single-member systems, PR systems are not as likely to discriminate in favour of new parties with a geographic or regional basis. A new party that enjoys the support of 10% of the population distributed evenly across the country would have a better chance of electing representatives under a PR system than it would under a single-member system.

■ Potential for Representative Outcomes

Under favourable conditions, list PR systems offer considerable potential for the production of representative outcomes. In her study of the factors contributing to the election of women in 23 democracies, Wilma Rule found that party list PR systems offer the greatest political opportunity for women.²³ Another study of the relationship between electoral structures and women's representation concluded that the optimal political structure is a multi-party system, with list PR, a low threshold for party legislative representation, and a large district magnitude.²⁴ (The issue of district magnitude is discussed below.)

Germany offers a clear illustration of the difference between single-member and list PR systems in terms of achieving representative outcomes. Half of the members of the German lower house (the Bundestag) are elected from single-member constituencies, while the other half are elected through a simple list PR system. The proportion of women elected through PR has been consistently higher than the proportion of women elected from single-member constituencies (see Table V).

Table V:
Number of Women Elected to the West German Bundestag
1969-1983

| Year | From Constituencies | From Party Lists |
|-------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1962 | 5 | 27 |
| 1972 | 4 | 24 |
| 1976 | 7 | 29 |
| 1980 | 11 | 30 |
| 1983 | 10 | 39 |

Source: Vernon Bogdanor, *What is Proportional Representation?* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1984), p. 116.

PR systems are favourable to representative outcomes for several reasons. First, simple list PR systems lend themselves to ticket balancing. With several places to fill, the party members or officials drawing up the lists can make them representative of society's diversity. In an effort to reflect this diversity, lists can allow for representation of various aspects of political identity, including (but not restricted to) gender. While nomination contests in single-member systems are "zero sum games" where one person's gain means another person's loss, nomination contests in PR systems are "positive sum games" where one person's gain is everyone's gain.²⁵ This means that it is in the interest of a white male professional candidate to ensure that he shares the party ballot with candidates who reflect the diversity of society in order that their party's ballot can appeal to the greatest number of voters.

A second advantage of simple list PR systems is their transparency. Simply put, the absence of women and members of other groups from party lists is noticeable. If women are disproportionately placed in ornamental positions low on the party's list, it is immediately evident. This is in contrast to the considerably more complex task of demonstrating that women are being nominated disproportionately in unwinnable ridings in a single-member system. Thus, party nomination practices are more open to public scrutiny in a PR system than they are in a single-member system.

Third, simple list PR systems do not pose institutional barriers to the introduction of representative quotas. An ideal quota system would guarantee that women and men would alternate positions on the list. Where affirmative action is especially necessary, a woman's name would head the list. Once gender parity is achieved, some system of equitably distributing the first-place position between women and men could be instituted. This would ensure that roughly half of the candidates elected from the party's list would be women.

To achieve the representation of other underrepresented groups, similar measures could be adopted. In a district with a significant racial minority population, for example, a proportion of spaces on the list could be reserved for candidates from racial minority groups. In such a circumstance, an arrangement could also be devised to ensure that half of the spaces reserved for racial minority candidates be filled by women in order to ensure representation of women from this community.

Many parties in countries with list PR electoral systems have adopted quotas for women's representation on the party list (the most celebrated instance of this is in Norway). In 1983, the Norwegian Labour Party (a major party which has frequently formed the government) endorsed an affirmative action proposal to ensure that at least 40% of its candidates were women. Although this was introduced as a guideline rather than a rule, it has had a strong effect on the composition of the Labour Party's parliamentary delegation. In 1981, women comprised 33% of the Labour Party delegation. By 1989, women comprised 51% of the delegation. All of the parties except one have made efforts to keep up with the Labour Party in terms of representation of women, with two of the smaller parties (the Liberals and the Socialist Left) requiring that their lists carry equal numbers of men and women.²⁶ By 1991, 34.5% of the members of the Norwegian legislature were women, as were 44% of members of the cabinet. In addition, the Prime Minister and the leaders of the two opposition parties were women.²⁷

Quotas have also been adopted by parties in a number of other countries where list systems are used. In the Netherlands, the Dutch Labour Party requires that 25% of its candidates be women. In Germany, the Green Party has adopted a 50% minimum quota for women on the

party's list, while the SPD (the major social democratic party) has resolved to enforce a 40% quota by 1998.²⁸ In Sweden, where candidate selection is performed by a party elite, most of the parties have come to adhere to the informal principle that every other candidate on the ballot should be a woman.²⁹ After the 1988 Swedish election, 38% of the seats in the legislature were held by women.

Before endorsing simple list PR systems as the best means of achieving representative outcomes, it is important to introduce a caveat. The outcome of an election in a simple list PR system is only as representative as the lists put forward by the parties. Although a PR system makes the selection of representative slates more likely, it is not the electoral system which selects candidates. Rather, it is the political party — either the party elite or a nominating convention comprised of party members.

Because simple list PR systems give political parties a complete monopoly over the composition and ordering of the list, representative outcomes are dependent on the willingness of the parties in the system to draw up lists that reflect the population's diversity, and that do not relegate members of underrepresented groups to ornamental positions at the bottom of the list. The following comparison reinforces this point: after elections in 1987 and 1993, respectively, only 12.8% of the members of the Italian legislature (elected through list PR) were women, while 18.3% of the members of the Canadian House of Commons (elected from single-member constituencies) were women.

Simple list PR systems have been most successful in the Scandinavian countries, where there is a greater acceptance within the broader political culture of group-based claims for representation. Party selection and nomination procedures in the Scandinavian countries respect a strong tradition of representation of different social groups.³⁰ As a result of this tradition of group representation, the parties in these countries are receptive to representative claims from women. Without the parties' receptivity to these claims, the list PR system would not be nearly as favourable to women as it has been.

Under a simple list PR system, women's organizations that want to encourage representative outcomes have two strategies open to them: an integrative strategy and a separatist strategy. The integrative strategy involves pressuring political parties to impose formal or informal quotas on the party list so that the lists reflect the diversity of society, at least along gender lines. As was noted above, this strategy has been very successful in the Scandinavian countries (except Iceland) and relatively successful in other Western European countries. In general, social democratic parties have been the most receptive to the integrative strategy.

The separatist strategy involves forming a women's party or a new party formed from a coalition of underrepresented groups. PR list systems, when combined with a reasonable level of popular support for feminist claims, appear to provide a hospitable context for independent women's parties. Despite this, women's groups in most countries with PR systems have pursued the integrative strategy rather than the separatist strategy.

The notable exception to this is Iceland. Because Icelandic parties, unlike the parties of other Scandinavian countries, did not accommodate women, feminist activists organized the "Women's Alliance", which developed a women's list to contest municipal and national elections. Of the fifteen women in the Icelandic parliament after the 1991 election, five were elected from the women's list.

The substantive effect of the separatist strategy has been mixed. On the one hand, a former Member of Parliament for the Women's Alliance argues that women's slates are an effective way for women to obtain political power because they: (a) allow women to form their political ideas freely and independently unrestricted by male conventions, ethics, and ideologies; and (b) liberate women from having to fight their way through male-dominated political parties.³¹ On the other hand, because the Women's Alliance by its own choice is not part of the governing coalition, there was only one woman in the 10-member Icelandic cabinet after the 1991 election.³²

■ Variations on List PR Systems

As noted above, PR list systems are designed to represent the shades of opinion within the electorate. Some variations on list PR systems, however, are designed to give voters some choice not only among parties but also among candidates. While a PR list system presents voters with an inflexible list of candidates, modified systems provide a variety of mechanisms to allow voters to reorder the list of candidates to reflect their own preferences. This decreases somewhat the party's monopoly on the choice of candidates.

In some list PR systems, voters can alter the list of the party they vote for by striking out the name of candidates whom they do not want elected. In Belgium, a voter can vote either for a party's list (and therefore its established order) or for one particular candidate of the party. Both a vote for a candidate or for the party list is considered a vote for the party for the purposes of allocating seats. Voting for a candidate rather than a list reorders the party's list; thus, if enough voters voted for a candidate with a relatively low place on the list, the list would be effectively reordered to elect the candidate in question at the expense of a candidate higher on the list.³³ It must be noted, however, that it is extremely uncommon for a candidate low on the list to gain enough votes to move far enough up the list to be elected.³⁴

Under some circumstances, it is possible that modified list PR systems can enhance the potential for representative outcomes beyond the potential offered by simple list PR systems. The necessary condition for this, however, is mobilization of a portion of the electorate to send a message to the party by reordering the list.

The "women's coup" in the 1971 Oslo, Norway municipal elections is one example of an effective use of this strategy. Frustrated by the unwillingness of parties to include significant numbers of women on the ballot in "mandate" positions (safe seats), women's organizations called on voters to systematically strike all the male names from their party's list in order to move women up to the mandate positions on the list. As a result of this campaign, the proportion of women on city council increased from approximately 20% to over 50% after the election.³⁵ In Finland, a system of compulsory personal election is used. Under this system,

parties draw up lists of candidates either in alphabetical order or in order of preference. Each voter casts a single ballot. Instead of voting for a party's list, however, the voter selects a candidate on one of the party lists for whom she casts her ballot. The candidates are elected on the total number of votes polled by the party and the individual votes cast for them personally.³⁶ Under this system, voters play a significant role in ordering the party lists.

Evidence suggests that the system works in favour of the election of women; Finnish women vote for women on the party lists.³⁷ A Gallup poll commissioned in 1979 found that 40% of Finnish women and 7% of Finnish men voted for a woman.³⁸ The system of personal vote used in Finland allows a voter who wants to vote for a woman to do so while still voting for the party of her choice (assuming that there is at least one woman on every list). This can be contrasted to the single-member constituency situation where it is likely that the party of one's choice will not have a woman running in the electoral district, thereby forcing the voter to choose between voting for a woman and voting for the party of her choice. It must be noted, however, that there are pitfalls with the Finnish system. If there are too many women on the party list, then it is possible that women's votes will be divided among these candidates and will not give any of the women enough votes to be elected.³⁹

From this brief discussion, it is clear that modifications of list PR systems can be favourable to the achievement of representative outcomes under certain circumstances. If parties do not balance their tickets, voters can reprimand them by rearranging the order of the list. However, this assumes that enough of the electorate can be mobilized to do this. For this to happen, autonomous women's organizations must mount independent campaigns in order to mobilize voters.

Single Transferable Vote PR Systems

The single transferable vote (STV) electoral system is sometimes known as the "Anglo-Saxon PR system" because it is used in elections in Irish and Australian (Senate) elections. The STV system seeks not only to secure proportional representation of party preference, but also to widen the choice open to the voter by allowing her to choose between candidates of the same

party as well as to choose between parties. Unlike a simple list PR system, the STV system is designed to minimize the influence of political parties in the election of representatives.⁴⁰ Under an STV system, parties draw up lists of candidates just as they do under the list system. However, instead of voting for a party list or candidate(s) on a list, a voter in an STV system ranks the candidates in order of preference.

Voters can use a variety of voting strategies under an STV system. For example, a voter committed to Party A would allocate all of her preferences to Party A's candidates, probably in the order that they appeared on the ballot. Alternatively, the voter could allocate her preferences to candidates lower on the list because of the candidates' stand on an issue or because the candidates are members of a group (gender, racial, etc.) that the voter thinks should be represented. Another strategy would be for a voter to divide her preferences among parties.

To be elected under an STV system, a candidate must win a quota of the total votes, worked out by the following formula:

$$\frac{\text{total valid votes cast}}{\text{number of seats} + 1} + 1$$

For example, in a district with five seats available, with 60,000 votes cast, a candidate would have to win 10,001 votes in order to be elected. The procedure for counting votes under this system is somewhat complex. It is outlined step-by-step below for a hypothetical election in a district with five seats available and three parties offering candidates:

- Step 1: All first preference votes are counted.
- Step 2: If no candidate has reached the quota, the candidate who has won the fewest first preference votes is eliminated. All of this candidate's first preference votes are reassigned to other candidates according to the second preference marked on each ballot.

- Step 3:** By this point, one or two candidates may have collected enough votes (10,001 in our example) to be elected. The winning candidates' surpluses are noted. The surplus consists of the total number of votes the candidate has accumulated minus the quota (10,001). If the surplus is not large enough to elect the next candidate, it is reserved for the time being.
- Step 4:** The lowest remaining candidate on the ballot is dropped, and her/his first preference votes are reassigned (as in Step 2). This continues until several more candidates are eliminated from the ballot. Candidates who are already declared elected continue to accumulate votes.
- Step 5:** Once the elected candidates' surpluses are large enough to elect other candidates, they are transferred. The procedure for calculating and transferring the surplus of hypothetical candidate A is as follows:
- * The size of the surplus is calculated. If candidate A had accumulated 11,001 votes and the quota was 10,001 votes, the surplus would be 1,000.
 - * All of Candidate A's votes are sorted into sub-parcels according to the next preference indicated on the ballot. If the next preference is for a candidate who has already been elected or eliminated, the following preference will be used, and so on.
 - * The sub-parcels are converted into percentages. For example, when Candidate A's votes were divided, 45% of next preferences were for Candidate B, 35% for Candidate C, and 20% for Candidate D.
 - * Candidate A's surplus is divided among candidates B, C, and D according to the proportion of next preferences. With a surplus of 1,000, Candidate B would receive 450 votes, Candidate C would receive 350 votes, and Candidate D would receive 200 votes.
- Step 6:** The elimination of candidates and the transfer of surpluses would continue until five candidates had accumulated the necessary 10,001 votes and had been declared elected.

The primary merit of the STV system as opposed to a list PR system is that it achieves a good degree of proportional representation without forcing voters to give their support to candidates they do not support. Moreover, it allows voters to support candidates across party lines. Some proponents of the STV system also note that it fosters some ideological diversity

within parties, as parties can allow voters to choose among candidates from different camps within the party.⁴¹

A major drawback of the STV system is its complexity for both the voters and the parties. The STV system asks the voter to make choices about parties and candidates. To make an informed decision, the voter must gather information about party platforms as well as about the histories, records, attributes, and other characteristics of candidates. Given that there are likely to be between ten and thirty serious candidates on the ballot (depending on the number of seats available and the number of parties contesting the election), this is a considerable task for the voter.

Research carried out in Ireland suggests that voters sometimes simplify their task by making a decision about which party to support and then allocating preferences to that party's candidates in alphabetical order (the order in which names appear on the ballot). In essence, the STV system may discriminate in favour of candidates whose names begin with letters near to the beginning of the alphabet.⁴² The same phenomenon has been noted in Australia.

The intricacies of the STV system also require parties to make strategic decisions about the number of candidates to nominate in each constituency. If the party nominates too many candidates in the electoral district, then it risks losing a seat because votes for the party will be divided among too many candidates. On the other hand, if the party nominates too few candidates, it risks losing a seat because there were not enough of the party's candidates to receive the voters' preferences. Parties must therefore decide on the number of candidates based on the number of seats available in the electoral district and the proportion of the vote which the party can expect to win in the district. Parties may win or lose seats, not because of the popular will, but because of miscalculation on the part of the party strategists.

■ Potential for Representative Outcomes

In her study of the factors contributing to the election of women in 23 democracies, Wilma Rule found that STV systems are second only to list PR systems in offering political opportunity for women.⁴³ The difference between a single-member majority system and an STV system is illustrated by Australia, where the House of Representatives is elected through a single-member system and the Senate is elected through an STV system. After the 1990 election, women comprised 6.7% of the House of Representatives and 23.6% of the Senate.

Again, it must be emphasized that STV systems do not guarantee results. This is illustrated by the Irish Dail which, although elected through STV, had only 8.5% women among its members after the 1987 election. Because Irish society is relatively traditional in terms of gender relations, the low representation cannot be attributed entirely to the electoral system.

Because STV systems involve drawing up party lists, they are just as open to quota systems as are list PR systems. Unlike the list PR system, however, the STV system cannot guarantee election to candidates near the top of the list. The electorate plays an active role in determining the order of the list. In essence, this means that an STV system is more likely than a list PR system to achieve representative outcomes in a country where the electorate is more committed to the ideal of a representative outcome than are the major political parties. A simple list PR system is more likely to achieve representative outcomes in a system where the political parties are committed to the ideal of representative outcomes while the electorate is relatively passive in this regard.

Because the voters effectively order the party list under the STV system, a party's candidates compete among themselves during the election campaign for the preferences of voters. Unlike a list PR system where the fortunes of all of the candidates on the list rely on the entire list's ability to garner electoral support, an STV system encourages candidates to run independent campaigns and compete among themselves. While this does not necessarily work against female and minority candidates, it may reward candidates who command personal networks and who are able to raise funds independent of the party.

The Issue of District Magnitude

In both list PR and STV systems, the number of seats available in the electoral district (the district magnitude) plays an important role in shaping outcomes. District magnitude under PR systems can range from over 100 (in Israel and the Netherlands the entire country is one electoral district) to 2 or 3.

There is a direct relationship between the size of districts in a PR system and "proportionality", i.e., the system's ability to translate the popular vote into seats without distorting the voters' preferences. Generally, proportionality can be maintained as long as the number of parties with significant support does not exceed the number of seats in each electoral district.⁴⁴ In a system with three major parties, then, proportionality could be maintained as long as all electoral districts had at least four seats.

Research concerning the effect of district magnitude on the election of women has found a positive relation between the size of the district and the proportion of women elected.⁴⁵ This means that the larger the electoral district, the greater the likelihood of a representative outcome. There are a number of reasons for this. First, as district magnitude increases, the exclusion of women and other groups from the list of party candidates becomes increasingly obvious and increases the risk of a negative reaction from voters.⁴⁶

Second, parties are more willing to include women and members of other groups on the slate if there are more places on the slate. As district magnitude increases, party selection becomes more of a positive-sum game, where everyone on the ballot benefits from its diversity. Research from Norway prior to the introduction of quotas on party lists demonstrated that the constituency associations were more willing to nominate women to positions high on the list when they expected the party to win more than one seat in the district. In 1981, women gained 16% of the mandate places in electoral districts where their parties won only one or two seats and 35% of the places where the party won three or more seats. A similar pattern was found in Sweden.⁴⁷

Third, some observers believe that voters may be hesitant to vote for a woman if she is their only representative, but may have no objection to voting for a woman as one of several candidates.⁴⁸ Most evidence, however, suggests that voters in western industrialized countries are not hesitant to vote for women.

It is clear that a larger district magnitude is more favourable to representative outcomes than a smaller district magnitude. Moreover, because the inclusion of women on the party list appears to be related to the number of seats the party expects to win, the number of parties in the electoral system is a factor in determining the minimum desirable district magnitude. Ideally, the minimum district magnitude should be twice the number of major parties in the system. For a system with three major parties, this would mean a minimum district magnitude of six. If the district magnitude is double the number of major parties, each party can expect to elect two candidates in constituencies where the vote is evenly split. In constituencies where the vote is unevenly divided, one or two parties can expect to elect more than two candidates. Presumably, parties will be more willing to nominate women when they are assured of winning two or more of the seats in the constituency.

DUAL-MEMBER CONSTITUENCIES

Dual-member constituencies do not, in and of themselves, constitute a distinct electoral system. Rather, list PR, STV, or multi-member (at large) electoral systems can have electoral districts with a district magnitude of two. As will be discussed below, some electoral systems are more compatible with dual-member constituencies than are others.

Dual-member constituencies have a certain appeal for people concerned about the election of women. Because women and men each comprise roughly half of the population, it seems only reasonable that there be female and male representatives from each electoral district. Christine Boyle has suggested that men and women vote in separate elections in each constituency to ensure that there is a representative of each sex from the constituency.⁴⁹ Although this notion

has an undeniable appeal, mainstream politicians would probably seriously resist recognizing gender as a primary component of political identity.

Dual-member constituencies have been used in some Canadian provinces in order to ensure representation of certain groups. Most notably, Prince Edward Island maintains a dual-member system at the provincial level. The original intent of this system was to ensure equal representation of Catholics and Protestants in the provincial legislature. Each constituency elects a Councillor and an Assemblyman [sic]. Candidates must declare which of these two offices they are contesting, and electors may cast one ballot for a candidate for Councillor and one ballot for a candidate for Assemblyman [sic]. This system acts as an informal guarantee of representation for Catholics and Protestants because parties will generally nominate a Catholic candidate for one office and a Protestant candidate for the other in each constituency. Although no research has been carried out to demonstrate this, the use of dual-member constituencies may have contributed to the relatively high proportion of women — 22% — in the P.E.I. legislature.

This system could certainly be adapted as a guarantee of representation for women, as long as the parties agreed or the electoral law required that one seat in each constituency be reserved for women. The result of this, however, would be a form of segregation, in which women ran against women and men ran against men. Like the system proposed by Boyle, this would require a recognition of gender as a fundamental element of political identity. Moreover, neither of these systems would provide the other benefits associated with proportional representation systems.

Dual-member constituencies and list PR systems, while technically compatible, are likely to produce only moderately representative outcomes. In a list PR system with a district magnitude of two, each party would run a list of two candidates and voters would cast a ballot for one party's list. The parties that place first and second in popular vote would each elect one candidate, as long as each party obtains at least one-third of the vote in the district.⁵⁰ This means that there are two possible outcomes in each electoral district:

- * Outcome 1: Two parties win more than 33% of the vote, so the first candidate on each party's list is elected. This is the most likely outcome in a race where there is a high degree of competition between two parties. For example, most of the constituencies in Atlantic Canada in the 1988 general election fit this profile, as do many constituencies in British Columbia and Saskatchewan.
- * Outcome 2: The second place party does not win 33% of the vote, so both candidates on the leading party's list will be elected. This is most likely to occur in areas where one party is dominant (such as the Progressive Conservatives in Alberta and Quebec in 1988), or where there is a close three-party competition and the vote against the leading party is divided between two other parties.

To understand the impact of dual-member PR systems on the representation of women, some assumptions must be made about the behaviour of parties in nominating candidates under such a system. For the sake of argument, assume that all of the major parties decide that their party's list will contain a woman and a man in each electoral district.

In constituencies where outcome 1 is expected, the nomination contest will focus on the number one spot on the list, as the number two spot will be essentially ornamental. All other things being equal, we can expect women to be about as successful in winning the number one spots in these constituencies as they are in winning their party's nomination in "safe" seats under a single-member constituency system. From constituencies with outcome 1, then, we can expect the proportion of members elected would be roughly equal to the proportion of women elected under a single-member system — in the current Canadian case, about 18%.

In constituencies with outcome 2, it is certain that half of the candidates elected will be women. Clearly, then, this would be an improvement on the single-member system. It must be noted, however, that there are likely to be more constituencies with outcome 1 than with outcome 2. This means that a PR system with dual-member constituencies is unlikely to be as effective a means of electing women as a list PR system with larger constituencies and a similar party quota system.

Moreover, the scenario outlined above establishes a trade-off between proportional representation of party preferences and representation of women. The greater the number of constituencies with outcome 2, the greater the election of women. However, constituencies with outcome 2 act like single-member constituencies in their representation of the popular vote, as the winning party takes all. Thus, the representation of women will be won at the expense of the representation of voters who have selected second or third place parties.

An STV electoral system with dual-member constituencies would be even less desirable than a list PR system with dual-member constituencies. Once again, assuming that parties would place a woman and a man on the list in every constituency, voters who were so inclined would be able to cast a first preference vote for the female candidate on their party's list, or even to select the female candidates from each party's list as their top preferences. In electoral districts where there was a high degree of inter-party competition, there would also be a high degree of competition between the candidates on the lists of the first and second place parties, as only one candidate from each party would be likely to win a seat.

There would also be a considerable degree of pressure for parties to run only one candidate in competitive ridings in order to prevent the party vote from being split between two candidates. This aspect of STV systems makes the assumption that every party would place a woman and a man on the ballot highly problematic. The difficulties inherent in combining an STV system with two-member constituencies are reflected in the fact that the Irish electoral system uses only three-, four-, and five-member constituencies.

A final possibility that would combine the logic of the dual-member constituency proposal with the benefits associated with PR systems would be a dual list PR or STV system. Under such a system, there would be two elections in each constituency and two sets of lists — one reserved for female candidates and one for male candidates. Electors would vote twice, casting a ballot in both races. This would guarantee election of women while maintaining the other benefits associated with PR or STV systems.

However, such a system would entail some difficulties. First, it would likely mean that the benefits associated with large district magnitude would be lost, so the party that won the largest proportion of the vote in the district would benefit to some extent. In the case of an STV system, moreover, it would make an already complex system even more complicated.

Finally, it is important to note that the same result can be achieved (at least in a list PR system) if legislation requires that the odd-numbered places on the party's lists be held by women. This would achieve the same objective as a dual list PR system while retaining the proportionality between votes and seats usually associated with PR.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND NOMINATION PRACTICES

Two important factors affect the election of women: political parties and their candidate nomination practices. Women have been elected in significant numbers in countries where major political parties have made commitments to achieving representative outcomes. Generally, parties have made these commitments only after women both inside and outside the party have exerted pressure on the party to implement affirmative action programs, such as reserving half of the places on the party list for women.

Although women's organizations in some countries (primarily in Scandinavia) have advocated legislation requiring parties to achieve approximate gender parity among candidates, no such legislation has been adopted.⁵¹ Where formal quotas for candidacy have been adopted, it has been in internal party rules rather than government legislation.

Within the context of a liberal democracy, state regulation of political parties is a difficult issue. A crucial criterion that distinguishes a democratic from a non-democratic political system is the separation of the state, and political parties (private organizations comprised of citizens associating freely for political purposes).

In recent years, however, there has been a recognition in Canada and elsewhere that political parties are also public organizations, as they hold a monopoly on political choice. It is virtually impossible to be elected to the Canadian House of Commons or to a provincial legislature without the endorsement of a major political party. In most constituencies, Canadian voters know that a vote for any candidate who is not running under the banner of one of the major parties is certain to be a wasted vote.

Political parties have increasingly become subject to government regulation because they enjoy a monopoly on political choice, are crucial to the operation of a democratic system, and receive considerable public funding. In Canada, parties were first recognized in 1970 in the *Canada Elections Act*, which requires that they register with the Chief Electoral Officer and report annually on their financial activities. In return, parties receive access to public funding and are identified on the ballot.⁵²

Under the current *Canada Elections Act*, candidate nomination and leadership selection procedures have been considered an internal matter for the parties to regulate as they see fit. However, in its 1991 report, the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing recommended regulation of nomination and leadership contests. Specifically, the Commission recommended the imposition of expenditure limits and financial disclosure requirements for candidate nomination contests.⁵³ The Commission also recommended financial incentives to encourage parties to nominate women in "winnable constituencies".⁵⁴ It is not yet clear whether these recommendations will be incorporated into a revised *Canada Elections Act*.

Were a system of proportional representation to be adopted for Canadian elections, it is possible that affirmative action provisions could be entrenched in the *Canada Elections Act*. Such provisions could, for example, require that the parties nominate a woman in all of the odd-numbered positions (1, 3, 5, etc.) on the party's list. Such a measure would be consistent with other reforms designed to make political parties effective vehicles for the representation of societal interests within the legislature. It would also give considerably more meaning to the

guarantee in the Canadian *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* that every citizen has the right to stand for election to the House of Commons.

However, this scenario is improbable because the political parties are unlikely to be willing to set a precedent for such extensive state intervention into internal party affairs. If parties are at all willing to accept mandatory quotas, they are more likely to accept such measures in their internal party constitutions than in the form of government regulation. Women's organizations may find it more fruitful to pursue this route than to advocate legislated quotas.

APPLICATION TO ELECTORAL REFORM IN CANADA

Proposals to adopt a PR electoral system in Canada have been put forward periodically. A notable instance of this was the suggestion, endorsed by the Special Joint Committee on a Renewed Canada in 1992, that a reformed Canadian Senate should be elected through a PR system. In the wake of the failure of the Canada Round of constitutional negotiations in 1992, it is not clear whether an elected Senate will be on the political agenda in the near future.

Although the reforms proposed by the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing do not include changes to the electoral system itself, the debate on policy issues surrounding elections affords women's organizations the opportunity to place proportional representation on the public agenda. The discussion below addresses some of the issues that might be included in a proposal for a new electoral system.

The Electoral System: PR or STV?

From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that either a list PR or an STV system would be more likely than the existing single-member system to result in representative outcomes. These systems encourage parties to engage in ticket balancing, pose fewer institutional barriers to the adoption of quotas, and are more open to the entry of new parties than are single-member

systems. There remains the question of which of the two systems and which variations on the system would best serve the interests of underrepresented Canadians.

A quantitative study comparing these two kinds of systems in terms of the election of women has concluded that list PR systems are superior to STV systems.⁵⁵ When considering these results, however, one must keep in mind that other factors affect the election of women. Australia and Ireland, the two countries where STV systems are used, are both relatively traditional societies insofar as gender equality is concerned. This can be contrasted with the Scandinavian countries which employ list PR systems, and which have an enviable record in terms of gender equality.

When determining which electoral system is more likely to produce a representative outcome, the probable behaviour of parties and voters under either system must be taken into consideration. As noted above, list PR systems give parties control over which candidates on the list are elected, while STV systems give voters control over which candidates are elected. In general, list PR systems are preferable to STV systems when political parties are as committed or more committed to achieving representative outcomes than is the electorate. Where the electorate is more committed to representative outcomes than are political parties, STV may be a better option because it gives voters the opportunity to order the candidates on the party list.

The question, then, is what candidate nomination practices Canadian parties would follow for elections under a list system. The three parties holding official party status in the House prior to the 1993 election (the Progressive Conservative Party, the Liberal Party, and the New Democratic Party) demonstrated at least a nominal commitment to increasing the number of women holding office. When a PR system was being discussed in the context of an elected Senate during the 1992 constitutional round, there was support for using such a system to increase the social representativeness of the Senate. All three of the parties represented on the Special Joint Committee on a Renewed Canada agreed that "parties should use the opportunity presented by multiple nominations to promote gender equality and the representation of Canada's social and cultural diversity within the political process."⁵⁶ Moreover, prior to the 1993 election,

all three of the parties launched internal initiatives to increase the number of women elected. The NDP adopted an affirmative action program which required constituency associations to conduct mandatory candidate searches to look for female, visible minority, and disabled candidates before the nomination was held. The Liberal Party created the Judy Campaign, chaired by Deputy Leader Sheila Copps, to recruit female candidates to run in "winnable" ridings. The National Progressive Conservative Women's Federation established a talent bank as a means of recruiting female candidates for the 1993 election, and provided potential candidates with assistance through a mentoring program, help in finding an official agent, and training in fundraising techniques.⁵⁷ The existence of these initiatives, combined with the presence of active women's groups within both parties, would suggest that these parties would be under considerable pressure to offer reasonably representative lists under a PR system. It is more difficult to predict the behaviour of the Reform Party and the Bloc Québécois, as they are more recent entrants into the political system.

Assuming that the major political parties would use some reasonably effective system of representational quotas under a list PR system, one can conclude that a list PR system would be somewhat preferable to an STV system because the list PR system allows parties to implement quotas more effectively than does an STV system. In addition, list PR systems have the advantage of being considerably simpler than STV systems, and therefore offer fewer impediments to voters.

If a list PR system were adopted, one variation that might be considered is a provision that allows voters to strike names off the list. This would leave open the avenue for women's groups to encourage voters to reorder party lists if parties are recalcitrant in offering representative lists. This also allows voters to play a role in ordering party lists without imposing the complexity of an STV system.

District Magnitude

As noted above, six is the ideal *minimum* district magnitude for achieving a representative outcome in a system with three major parties. Districts with fewer than six seats, when

combined with a three-party system, would decrease the probability of a party winning two or more of the seats in a district. This in turn decreases the probability of a representative outcome because it increases the probability of a party winning only one seat in a district. When a party expects to win only one seat, the dynamics of a nomination contest under a single-member plurality system are replicated, as it is an all-or-nothing contest for the top spot. Ticket balancing becomes a viable option only when a party expects to win two or more seats.

In addition, smaller districts might also be unfortunate from the perspective of proportionality. As noted above, proportionality between the party's percentage of the popular vote and the percentage of seats the party wins is achieved when the number of seats in each district is equal to the number of major parties plus one. Adoption of a PR system can encourage the formation of one or more new political parties, resulting in four- or even five-party races. With five major parties, the *minimum* optimal district magnitude would be six.

Although a minimum district size of six is ideal, some peculiarities of the Canadian case may make this a difficult principle to apply to federal elections. Specifically, Prince Edward Island has four seats in the House of Commons, the Northwest Territories has two, and the Yukon has one. Given the role that federal arrangements play in the regional distribution of seats in Canada, it would be highly unusual to create an electoral district that crossed provincial/territorial boundaries. It is, however, possible to accommodate this characteristic of the Canadian system without unduly compromising the six-seat minimum district size. The most manageable way of doing this would be to use the principle of a minimum district size of six in most of the country, but to make exceptions for smaller districts in special cases, notably P.E.I. and the two territories.⁵⁸

Mixed or Add-On Systems

Many proposals for electoral reform in Canada advocate adopting an "add-on" or mixed single-member and PR electoral system such as the one used in Germany.⁵⁹ Under such a system, half (or some proportion) of the seats are elected through a single-member system while the remaining seats are elected through a PR system. Advocates of mixed systems argue that

they combine the advantages of both kinds of electoral systems. The use of PR ensures considerable proportionality between popular votes and seats in the legislature, while the use of single-member districts creates a direct representative relationship between a legislator and constituents in a geographic area.

In terms of creating representative outcomes, a mixed system is less favourable than a regular PR system but is more favourable than a regular single-member system. As noted above, in the German experience with a mixed system, considerably more women are elected through the PR portion of the system than through the single-member portion.

If Canada were to adopt a mixed system for elections to the House of Commons, representative outcomes would be made more likely if the PR portion of the system were to elect a significant portion of the seats. Essentially, the greater the proportion of seats elected through PR (as opposed to through a single-member system), the greater the probability of a representative outcome. Using a mixed system, the optimal *minimum* district magnitude for achieving representative outcomes would still be six. Consequently, it might be necessary to expand the size of the House of Commons under such a system to benefit from the PR system. Thus, although a mixed system is not as effective as a simple PR system for achieving representative outcomes, it would nonetheless be an improvement over the existing system.

CONCLUSION

Numerous reforms to Canadian electoral law could be made to reduce the barriers to women's participation in political life. These include regulating party nominations and leadership campaigns, and creating incentives for parties to nominate women.⁶⁰ The most direct and effective reform, however, would be the adoption of a proportional representation electoral system.

Although electoral systems seldom guarantee representative outcomes, they do significantly affect the potential for such outcomes. Electoral systems constrain or facilitate political parties' efforts to select candidates who mirror the composition of the electorate.

When political parties are committed to achieving representative outcomes, when general social conditions encourage women's active participation in electoral politics, and when there are few formal or informal barriers to the entry of women and other marginalized groups into formal politics, international experience suggests that PR systems pose fewer barriers to achieving representative outcomes than do single-member systems. Among West European and North American countries, the countries with the greatest proportion of women in their legislatures — Finland, Norway, and Sweden — employ PR electoral systems, while the countries with a lower proportion of women — the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada — employ single-member systems.

Single-member systems present several barriers to achieving representative outcomes. Because each party nominates only one candidate in each electoral district, there is no opportunity for ticket balancing, i.e., ensuring that members of relevant groups are among the party's candidates. Moreover, nomination practices tend to be highly decentralized in single-member systems, so it is difficult for parties to impose affirmative action measures to ensure that members of underrepresented groups are nominated, particularly in districts where the party is likely to win. In addition, the logic of a single-member system requires that the party nominate the most appealing (or least offensive) candidate. Consequently, party members may believe they are taking an electoral risk if they deviate from the norm of the white, male, professional candidate.

PR systems are more favourable to achieving representative outcomes than are single-member systems. There are several reasons for this. First, parties nominate lists of candidates in each district and are therefore able to engage in ticket balancing. Second, parties experience pressure to engage in ticket balancing because of the transparency of the list system. It is immediately evident to voters when parties are not nominating representative lists or when

parties are placing members of marginalized groups at the bottom of their list. Third, the use of lists makes it much easier for parties to employ affirmative action provisions in candidate selection procedures. For example, several European countries require that male and female candidates alternate positions on the party's list.

When weighing the relative merits of list and STV PR systems, it is important to recall that list systems give parties control over which candidates on the list will be elected, while STV systems give voters control over which candidates will be elected. Consequently, list systems are more favourable to achieving representative outcomes when parties are committed to achieving representative outcomes; STV systems are preferable when voters are more committed than parties to achieving representative outcomes.

Assuming that Canadian parties are in fact committed to electing more representative legislatures, a list PR system would be the most effective means of achieving this end. Ideally, a list PR system would operate with electoral districts electing at least six MPs. This would decrease the probability that a party would elect only one person in a district. When a party expects to elect only one candidate in a district, the nomination contest becomes a "winner takes all" event, thereby making ticket balancing purely cosmetic.

The benefits of PR systems are not limited to facilitating representative outcomes. These electoral systems also translate voters' preferences into legislative outcomes more accurately than do single-member systems. Moreover, PR systems encourage the development of party systems that offer voters a wider array of choice. Various measures can be adopted to mitigate the instability often associated with PR systems.

The inclusion of women is not an automatic consequence of a proportional representation electoral system. Where PR systems have elected women in significant numbers, one finds a history of women working within and outside political parties to encourage the parties to reflect the diversity of society on their electoral lists. If Canadian women are to be represented proportionately in the House of Commons or in an elected Senate, we must ensure, either

through legislation or through internal party regulations, that political parties offer lists that reflect the diversity of Canada in terms of gender, race, and other relevant characteristics.

ENDNOTES

1. For example, see Philip Norton, *The Commons in Perspective* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), p. 55.
2. See Canada, Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing (Pierre Lortie, president), *Reforming Electoral Democracy: Final Report*, Volume 1 (Ottawa: 1991), p. 269.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 169-192. For a discussion of the New Zealand system, see Augie Fleras, "Aboriginal Electoral Districts for Canada: Lessons from New Zealand", in *Aboriginal Peoples and Electoral Reform in Canada*, ed. Robert A. Milen, Volume 9 of the Research Studies of the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing (Ottawa: RCERPF, 1991), and Roger Gibbins, "Electoral Reform and Canada's Aboriginal Population: An Assessment of Aboriginal Electoral Districts" in Milen, ed., *ibid.*
4. Wilma Rule, "Electoral Systems, Contextual Factors and Women's Opportunity for Election to Parliament in Twenty-Three Democracies", *Western Political Quarterly*, vol. 40, no. 3 (1987).
5. Although New Zealand currently employs a single-member plurality system, a national referendum in the fall of 1992 endorsed a proposal to change to a PR system.
6. Vernon Bogdanor, *What is Proportional Representation?: A Guide to the Issues* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1984), p. 14.
7. Canada, Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, *Reforming Electoral Democracy*, see note 2, p. 20.
8. There is an incidental gender element to this relationship when one considers the 1988 Canadian election. The 1988 National Election Study showed that 52% of men and 43% of women voted for the Progressive Conservative party. Women were more likely than men to support the Liberal and New Democratic Parties. When the electoral system translated votes into seats, it overrepresented the party chosen by a majority of men, while underrepresenting the two parties supported by a majority of women.
9. From Alan Frizzell, Jon Pammett and Anthony Westell, *The Canadian General Election of 1988* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1989), p. 134; unofficial election results, Office of the Chief Electoral Officer for Canada.
10. Bogdanor, *What is Proportional Representation?*, see note 6, p. 17.

11. Rule, "Electoral Systems, Contextual Factors and Women's Opportunities for Election to Parliament in Twenty-Three Democracies", see note 4, p. 494.
12. Bogdanor, What is Proportional Representation?, see note 6, p. 115.
13. Geoffrey York, "NDP to Require Women to Run in Specified Number of Ridings", *The Globe and Mail*, June 11, 1991, p. A1.
14. Tim Harper, "NDP Begins Drive to Elect Minorities and Women", *The Toronto Star*, November 24, 1991, p. A2.
15. Jean-Louis Thiébaud, "France: The Impact of Electoral System Change", in *Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden of Politics*, ed. Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh (London: Sage Publications, 1988), p. 89.
16. See Anna Coote and Polly Pattullo, *Power and Prejudice: Women and Politics* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1990), p. 161; Ross Evans Paulson, *Women's Suffrage and Prohibition: A Comparative Study of Equality and Social Control* (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman [1973]), p. 193; and Sylvia B. Bashevkin, *Toeing the Lines: Women and Party Politics in English Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), pp. 28-31.
17. Susan Welch and Donley Studlar, "Multi-Member Districts and the Representation of Women: Evidence from Britain and the United States", *Journal of Politics*, vol. 52, no. 2 (1990), p. 403.
18. Susan J. Carroll, *Women as Candidates in American Politics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), pp. 40-41.
19. Welch and Studlar, "Multi-Member Districts and the Representation of Women", see note 17, p. 396.
20. Chandler Davidson and George Korbel, "At Large Elections and Minority Group Representation: A Reexamination of Historical and Contemporary Evidence", *Journal of Politics*, vol. 43, no. 4 (1981); Susan Welch, "The Impact of At-Large Elections on Representation of Blacks and Hispanics", *Journal of Politics*, vol. 52, no. 4 (1990).
21. Douglas J. Amy, "Improving Representation for Women and Minorities: Is Proportional Representation the Key?" (Paper presented at the 1991 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1991), p. 9.
22. A great deal of the instability in the Italian system can be attributed to an absence of party discipline in the legislature rather than dysfunctions of the electoral system.

- 23. Rule, "Electoral System, Contextual Factors and Women's Opportunities for Election to Parliament in Twenty-Three Democracies", see note 4.
- 24. Welch and Studlar, "Multi-Member Districts and the Representation of Women", see note 17, p. 408.
- 25. Richard E. Matland, "Institutional Variables Affecting Female Representation in National Legislatures: The Case of Norway" (Paper presented at the 1991 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1991), p. 2.
- 26. *Ibid.*; and Amy, "Improving Representation for Women and Minorities", see note 21. The right-wing Progress Party, which has a sizeable parliamentary delegation, has made no effort to nominate women. Opinion surveys have found that the majority of the Progress Party's supporters are male, many of whom hold extremely traditional views of women (see Matland, "Institutional Variables Affecting Female Representation in National Legislatures", see note 25, p. 14).
- 27. William Schmidt, "Who's In Charge Here? Chances are it's a Woman", *The New York Times*, May 22, 1991, p. A4.
- 28. Eva Kolinsky, "Political Participation and Parliamentary Careers: Women's Quotas in West Germany", *West European Politics*, vol. 14, no. 1 (1991).
- 29. Dianne Sainsbury, "Bringing Women Into Elected Office in Sweden and the United States: Political Opportunity Structures and Women's Strategies" (Paper Delivered at the 1991 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1991).
- 30. Hege Skjeie, *The Feminization of Power: Norway's Political Experiment (1986-)* (Oslo, Norway: Institute for Social Research, 1988), p. 23; and Sören Holmberg, "Political Representation in Sweden", *Scandinavian Political Studies*, vol. 12, no. 1 (1989), p. 2.
- 31. Sigridur Duna Kristmundsdottir, "Time To Act", in *Premier Sommet Mondial: "Femmes et multidimensionnalité du pouvoir"* (Montreal: Premier Sommet Mondial "Femmes et multidimensionnalité du pouvoir", 1990), p. 391. For a discussion of the formation and initial electoral involvement of the Icelandic women's list, see Lena Dominelli and Gudrun Jonsdottir, "Feminist Political Organization in Iceland: Some Reflections on the Experience of Kwenna Framboðid", *Feminist Review*, no. 30 (1988).
- 32. Paula Snyder, *The European Women's Almanac* (London: Scarlet Press, 1992), p. 184.
- 33. Gordon Smith, *Politics in Western Europe*, 4th ed. (London: Heinemann, 1983), p. 76.

34. Lieven De Winter, "Belgium: Democracy or Oligarchy", in *Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Gallagher and Marsh, see note 15, p. 21.
35. Matland, "Institutional Variables Affecting Female Representation in National Legislatures", see note 25, p. 11.
36. Elina Haavio-Mannila *et al.*, eds., *Unfinished Democracy: Women in Nordic Politics* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1985), p. 55.
37. Alja Alho, "Women Active Participants in the Politics of Finland — Yet Problems Remain", *Canadian Woman Studies/les cahiers de la femme*, vol. 9, no. 2 (summer 1988), p. 45.
38. Haavio-Mannila *et al.*, *Unfinished Democracy*, see note 36, p. 58.
39. To illustrate how nominating too many women could decrease the probability of electing women under a system of compulsory personal election, the table below compares a list with two women among six candidates to a list with three women among six candidates. Assuming (for the sake of simplicity) that 40% or 400 of 1,000 voters in the district will vote only for a woman; that the remaining 60% or 600 voters will vote only for a man; that the votes will be evenly distributed between female candidates; and that the votes will be evenly divided between the two parties, it is possible to conceive of an outcome in which both of the women on the first list are elected, while none of the women on the second list are elected.

**Hypothetical Election Results in a
Compulsory Personal Vote System with
1,000 Voters Electing Six Representatives**

| Party 1 | | Party 2 | |
|---|----------------|---|----------------|
| Candidates | Votes Received | Candidates | Votes Received |
| Mr. A | 85 | Ms. A | 67 |
| Mr. B | 150 | Mr. B | 150 |
| Ms. C | 100 | Ms. C | 67 |
| Mr. D | 80 | Mr. D | 75 |
| Ms. E | 100 | Ms. E | 66 |
| Mr. F | 85 | Mr. F | 75 |
| Total Votes: 500 Three candidates elected: Mr. B; Ms. C; Ms. E | | Total Votes: 500 Three candidates elected: Mr. B; Mr. D; Mr. F | |

40. Bogdanor, *What is Proportional Representation?*, see note 6, pp. 76-77.
41. Bogdanor, *What is Proportional Representation?*, see note 6, p. 117.
42. Leslie Sykes, *Proportional Representation: Which System?* (Oadby: Hornbeam Press, 1990). In the 1987 Irish election, 28.6% of candidates had surnames beginning with the first four letters of the alphabet, but 35.5% of candidates elected fell into this category.
43. Rule, "Electoral System, Contextual Factors and Women's Opportunities for Election to Parliament in Twenty-Three Democracies", see note 4.
44. Michael Cassidy, "Fairness and Stability in Canadian Elections: The Case for An Alternative Electoral System" (Paper prepared for the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, Ottawa, 1992).
45. Rule, "Electoral System, Contextual Factors and Women's Opportunities for Election to Parliament in Twenty-Three Democracies", see note 4.
46. Matland, "Institutional Variables Affecting Female Representation in National Legislatures", see note 25, p. 2.
47. Haavio-Mannila *et al.*, *Unfinished Democracy*, see note 36, p. 57.
48. Matland, "Institutional Variables Affecting Female Representation in National Legislatures", see note 25, p. 2.
49. Christine Boyle, "Home Rule for Women: Power-Sharing Between Men and Women", *Dalhousie Law Journal*, vol. 7, no. 3 (1983), p. 800.
50. Rein Taagepera, "The Effect of District Magnitude and Properties of Two-Seat Districts", in *Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences*, ed. Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (New York: Agathon Press, 1986), p. 92. This assumes that the d'Hondt distribution rule is being used. With the Largest Remainder or Sainte-Lague rules, the second largest party is assured a seat with as little as a quarter of the votes.
51. See Haavio-Mannila *et al.*, *Unfinished Democracy*, see note 36, p. 56.
52. Canada, Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, *Reforming Electoral Democracy*, see note 2, p. 239.
53. Canada, Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, *Reforming Electoral Democracy*, see note 2, p. 362.

54. Canada, Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, *Reforming Electoral Democracy*, see note 2, p. 273.
55. Rule, "Electoral System, Contextual Factors and Women's Opportunities for Election to Parliament in Twenty-Three Democracies", see note 4.
56. Canada, Parliament, Special Joint Committee on a Renewed Canada, *A Renewed Canada: Report* (Ottawa: February 28, 1992), p. 46.
57. For a discussion of these initiatives, see Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on Electoral Reform, *Minutes of Proceedings*, January 26, 1993, 8:105.
58. An alternative way to maintain the six-seat minimum district magnitude would be to increase the size of the House of Commons by 50%, thereby increasing the number of MPs from P.E.I. to six. With a larger House, larger district magnitudes are more easily achieved. For a discussion of the merits of increasing the size of the House of Commons, see John Courtney, "The Size of Canada's Parliament: An Assessment of the Implications of a Larger House of Commons", in *Institutional Reforms for Representative Government*, ed. Peter Aucoin (Toronto: University of Toronto Press; [Ottawa]: Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, 1985).
59. William P. Irvine, "A Review and Evaluation of Electoral System Reform Proposals", in *Institutional Reforms for Representative Government*, ed. Aucoin, *ibid.*, and Cassidy, "Fairness and Stability in Canadian Elections", see note 44.
60. For a comprehensive discussion of these and other reforms, see the Report of the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, *Reforming Electoral Democracy*, see note 2.

APPENDIX: METHODS OF ALLOCATING SEATS IN PR SYSTEMS¹

There are several different methods of allocating seats under PR systems. This appendix will consider two of the most common: the D'Hondt System and the Hare Quota system.

The D'Hondt System

The D'Hondt system divides the number of votes won by a party by a divisor that includes the number of seats so far allocated to that party. Seats are allocated to the party that has the most "adjusted" votes at each stage — that is, the most votes after division by the divisor.

Table A-1 below gives an example of a three-party race in a five-seat constituency with 100,000 votes cast. The divisor in each iteration is $(1 + n)$ where n is the number of seats awarded. Therefore, in the example, the divisor for Party A is $(1 + 1)$ in the second to fourth rounds and is $(1 + 2)$ in the final round. After the third round, the divisor for Party B is $(1 + 1)$. In this example, Party A wins three seats, while Parties B and C win one each.

Table A-1: Allocation Using d'Hondt

| Iteration | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|-----------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|--------|
| | Adjusted Vote | | | | |
| Party A | 48,000 | 24,000 | 24,000 | 24,000 | 16,000 |
| Party B | 27,900 | 27,900 | 13,900 | 13,900 | 13,900 |
| Party C | 24,100 | 24,100 | 24,100 | 12,100 | 12,100 |

(Bold print indicates party elects a candidate)

¹ This appendix is adapted from Michael Cassidy, "Fairness and Stability in Canadian Elections: The Case for an Alternative Electoral System" (Paper prepared for the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, Ottawa, 1992).

The Hare Quota System

This system calculates a quota based on the number of total votes in an election divided by the number of seats to be distributed. Each party's vote is then divided by this quota and the number of seats each party received is the integer portion of this division. Since this rarely allocates all of the seats available, the remaining seats are distributed to the parties with the largest remainders, in the order of size, until all the seats are distributed among the parties.

Table A-2 below illustrates the allocation of seats using the Hare Quota system with the same election results as in Table A-1 above. The allocation of seats among parties in this example is the same as it would have been under the d'Hondt system: three seats for Party A and one seat for both Party B and Party C.

Table A-2: Allocation Using Hare Quota

Total Votes: 100,000. Quota = $100,000/5 = 20,000$

| Party | Vote | # Seats | Remainder | # Seats | Total |
|---------|--------|---------|-----------|---------|-------|
| Party A | 48,000 | 2 | 8,000 | 1 | 3 |
| Party B | 27,900 | 1 | 7,900 | 0 | 1 |
| Party C | 24,100 | 1 | 4,100 | 0 | 1 |

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