

*Douglas J. Amy*

This is Exhibit F to the affidavit of  
Douglas Amy, Sworn before me this  
day of April, 2001

\_\_\_\_\_  
Notary Public

Commonwealth of Massachusetts  
Hamshire, S.S. Date 4/13/01  
Then personally appeared the above named  
DOUGLAS J. AMY  
and acknowledge the foregoing instrument  
to be his free act and deed, before me,  
Margaret A. Notary Public

*Margaret A.*

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES  
JANUARY 17, 2008

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## ELECTORAL SYSTEMS, CONTEXTUAL FACTORS AND WOMEN'S OPPORTUNITY FOR ELECTION TO PARLIAMENT IN TWENTY-THREE DEMOCRACIES

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THE PURPOSE of this article is to ascertain which electoral arrangements, parties, and socioeconomic conditions offer the most opportunity for women's election to parliament. Another objective is to explicate the relationship between electoral systems and other contextual variables as they relate to women's parliamentary recruitment in various countries. Thirdly, we seek to determine which countries among twenty-three democracies in our sample allow the greatest to the least political opportunity for women.

### PART I. ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT PREDICTORS

#### *The Variables Studied and the Hypothesized Relationships*

Numerous researchers have observed a positive relationship between proportional representation (PR) and women's opportunity for election to parliament (Duverger 1955; Currell 1974; Bogdanor 1984). However, with few exceptions (Rule 1981, 1984, and Norris 1985) there has been no systematic empirical verification of this hypothesis, nor has there been an attempt to control for other political and socio-contextual factors. In addition, except for Norris (1985) there has been no systematic study of the effect of different PR, majoritarian and plurality systems on women's election to parliament.

Moreover, the impact of district magnitude (M) — the number of representatives per district — on women's recruitment to national legislatures has not been investigated, although it would appear to be a fruitful area for inquiry. Previous research on multimember districts and women's election to U.S. state legislatures show a positive relationship<sup>1</sup> (Clark et al. 1984; Carroll 1985; Rule 1986, and Darcy, Welch and Clark 1987).


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<sup>1</sup> For example, of the twenty U.S. states with some or all multimember assembly and state senate districts in 1984, the Pearsonian correlation with the percentages of women in both houses was .29 significant at the .02 level (Rule 1986). All multimember district states have non-party list systems.

In addition, recent work on district magnitude indicates that the number of representatives per district ( $M$ ) has a direct effect on the amount of turnover in parliament, which varies from 18 percent to 54 percent in thirteen Western countries (Katz 1986, Table 4.2). The smaller the  $M$ , the smaller the turnover and vice versa (Katz 1986: 97-101). Significantly, low turnover has been pinpointed as a major reason for women's low representation in the U.S. House of Representatives (Anderson and Thorson 1984) and Britain's House of Commons (Welch 1985). Thus women's underrepresentation in both these countries' national legislatures in part may be a function of the single-member district (SMD) majority/plurality electoral system. The bi-variate relationship between district magnitude in twenty-two countries and the percent of women elected to parliament in 1980-82 is displayed below in Figure 1. (West Germany is omitted from the figure because of its hybrid electoral system.) A linear relationship in Figure 1 is shown along with several outliers — namely New Zealand, Italy, Austria, Israel and The Netherlands.



The first hypothesis to be tested statistically is that the greater the district magnitude, the greater the percent of women in parliament. As the number of representatives in constituencies increases, the percentage of the vote needed for election diminishes (the general formula is  $100/M + 1$ ).

Therefore, in theory, women and other underrepresented political minorities<sup>2</sup> have a greater chance for election when the district magnitude is high. It was hypothesized that  $M$  would be the most important predictor of women's election to parliament since this political component varies considerably among the twenty-three countries.

An alternative hypothesis is that the party list system of proportional representation is the most significant predictor of women's political opportunity for election to parliament. Under this system the parties in a state draw up nationwide lists of candidates for parliament or district lists which are presented to the voters. The proportion of members of Parliament elected from each party usually (Lijphart 1986a) reflects the proportion of votes given each party by the electorate. Accordingly, the list system emphasizes political party representation rather than individual representation and parliamentary candidates run as a team on a party slate. Women are added to the lists as a means of broadening the general appeal of the team ticket.

Other electoral arrangements include the single transferable vote (as in Ireland, Mair 1986: 290-91), the single nontransferable vote (as in Japan, Lijphart, Pintor and Sone 1986b: 154-55) and the single member district system (as in Britain and her former colonies) tend to focus on the general appeal of individuals. Both the Irish and Japanese systems are actually forms of proportional representation with multimember districts and no party lists. As in the SMD countries, voters in Japan and Ireland choose among candidates rather than parties on their ballots. In such non-party-list electoral systems, parties or other recruitment elites may be reluctant to risk nominating or endorsing women, even though there is considerable evidence (in the British and U.S. cases) that women are as likely as men to be elected in the constituencies in which they contest<sup>3</sup> (Welch and Studlar 1985; Bernstein 1986, 1; Darcy and Schramm 1977). There may be other disadvantages and/or disincentives for women candidates or potential women candidates in non-party list electoral systems as compared to their counterparts in list-PR countries, such as the necessity of individually raising campaign monies (Carroll 1985: 45-55) and in the onerous aspects of individual campaigns.

Another political hypothesis tested here is the negative effect of rightwing political parties on women's parliamentary representation. Although Duverger (1955) and others (Rasmussen 1983; Kohn 1980; Beckwith 1984) have observed that women are more likely to be nominated and elected by left than by right parties, this relationship has not been tested over a wide range of countries. The theory is that rightwing parties have a more traditional view of women's role and are less likely than leftwing and even center parties to nominate women for parliament. Rightwing parties were operationalized as those which gave support to the free market, were anti-communist and were monarchist or religious advocates.

<sup>2</sup> While the election of blacks to at-large multimember city councils in the U.S has been minimal in the past (Engstrom and McDonald 1986: 203-25), recent research (Weaver 1986) suggests that this relationship may be changing.

<sup>3</sup> The inference cannot be drawn, however, from what may be an atypical sample of constituencies to the universe of elections in a country.

Past research has found a positive relationship between women's parliamentary election, percentage of women in the workforce, and extent of women college graduates (Rule 1981, 1984), and a negative relationship to proportion of Catholic population (Rule 1984; Cook 1985). However, Norris (1985) found no statistically significant association among these variables and women's parliamentary recruitment when a public opinion survey of nine states was entered into a multiple regression which otherwise contained data on twenty-four countries. Consequently the findings are inconclusive and limited. However, they are suggestive of the positive role public opinion may play in the election of women to parliament if the electoral system is not unfavorable (see Welch and Studlar 1986, on the British and U.S. cases).

Another question studied in this analysis is the effect of unemployment on women's recruitment to parliament. Research done on the 1970s period when significant levels of unemployment existed only in some counties showed there was a negative relationship (Rule 1981). Testing a related variable, economic affluence, Cook (1985) found a positive relationship to the extent of women's legislative elites. In this present analysis the hypothesis is that unemployment has a negative effect whereas full employment contributes to women's national legislative opportunity.

#### *Data and Method of Analysis*

Data on electoral structures, political parties, socioeconomic conditions and the percent of women in parliament were collected for twenty-three countries in the 1980-1982 period.<sup>4</sup> During that time the range in percent of women in national legislatures was from 0 percent in Australia to 28 in Sweden, with an average of 9.2 percent. In the preceding decade women's representation in parliament increased more than 50 percent. However, in this ten-year period there was little change in the nations' rank order of women's parliamentary representation (the rank correlation is .89 between 1970's figures and 1980s): the Nordic countries continue to lead, most of the European countries are in the middle range, and Britain and her former colonies continue to lag (see Table 2 on p. 483). Coincident with this growth in women's recruitment to parliament in the 1970-80s has been the development of the women's movement in these countries (Loven-duski and Hills 1981; Bradshaw 1982; Flanz 1983; Morgan 1984).

Stepwise multiple correlation/regression analysis was used first, to determine the most to the least significant nonoverlapping predictors of women's political opportunity for election to parliament, and secondly for comparative purposes to determine whether any changes have taken place in the predictors within the past decade. Specifically, the results of an earlier

<sup>4</sup> An unexpected development since that period occurred in the Canadian elections of 1984. Women's percentages increased to 9.6 percent in the House of Commons as a result of upset victories by the Tory party, the Progressive Conservatives (Bagnell 1984). Conversely, French party list/PR elections of 1986 show no appreciable rise in women's representation in parliament (Embassy of France, July 1986), apparently because of failure of the major parties to place women on the PR lists in favorable positions.

study using the 1970s data (Rule 1981) will be compared with this analysis of the 1980s.

Stepwise multiple correlation/regression is useful for testing theory, in this case that political system variables take precedence over socioeconomic components in predicting women's parliamentary representation. The most highly correlated independent variable is selected on the first step to predict the dependent variable, percent of women in parliament, and on subsequent steps other independent variables are added which are not highly intercorrelated with each other. The problem of multi-collinearity is thereby eliminated because closely intercorrelated variables are removed from the analysis. The reliability of the findings may be checked by repeated tests introducing new variables and eliminating others and by other types of analysis using the same data, such as factor analysis (Rummel 1970: 202-4), which is employed in Part III of this article.

#### *Results of the Analysis*

Several multiple regressions were undertaken with and without district magnitude, which has a direct correlation of only .34 with percent women in parliament. In all the regressions party-list system PR remained the major predictor, with women in the paid workforce second and women college graduates third. When district magnitude was entered with the other variables in the stepwise regression, it was eliminated from the table because it intercorrelates .73 with list system PR. (Later in Factor 1 we see list/PR and district magnitude together with non-right parties as a cluster of political system variables.) When district magnitude was not included with the other variables, percent of unemployed entered the equation as a negative variable for women's parliamentary recruitment, as did percent right party members in parliament and a country's proportion of Catholics. The results are shown below in Table 1 along with the 1972 regression.

The order of variables has not changed over the 1972-82 period. Type of electoral system is still the major predictor. However, in the 1982 results we have confirmed Norris' (1985) finding that the party list/PR system is the most favorable for women's recruitment to national legislatures. In turn, non-list/PR systems, including the single-member district system of the U.S.A., Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and France, and the electoral systems of Ireland and Japan are least favorable.

The proportions of women working for pay has increased in the past decade. In turn, this variable accounts for more of the variance in explaining increases in women's election to parliament in the 1982 period. The percent of women in the workforce correlates negatively with unemployment and with percent Catholic in the 1982 study. Therefore as unemployment increases, women in the workforce decrease. This pattern is particularly prevalent in the predominantly Catholic countries of Belgium, Ireland, Italy, and Spain.

The amount of variance explained by percent of women college graduates remained stable in the 1982 period while unemployment diminished in amount of variance explained in the percent of women in parliament.

TABLE 1  
MOST POWERFUL PREDICTORS OF RECRUITMENT OF WOMEN PARLIAMENT MEMBERS:  
MULTIPLE STEPWISE REGRESSION 1982  
(N = 23)

Independent Variables	Multiple Correlation Coefficient (R)	Cumulative % of Variance Explained (R <sup>2</sup> )	% Variance Explained by Each Variable
Party List/PR system of elections	.53	28	28
Percent women economically active	.73	54	26
Percent women college graduates	.82	67	13
Percent unemployed*	.87	76	9
Percent right M.P.'s*	.89	80	4
Percent Catholic (logged)*	.91**	82	2

\* The zero order correlation of this variable is negative.

\*\* Significant at less than the .01 level when corrected for degrees of freedom.

Sources: *Almanac of Canada* (Toronto: Corpus, 1984); Arthur S. Banks and William Overstreet, eds., *Political Handbook of the World* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1981, 1982, 1983); Alan S. Day and Henry W. Degenhardt, *Political Parties of the World* (Detroit: Research Co., 1980); *Europa Yearbook* (London: Europa, 1981) Vols. I & II; Gisbert H. Flanz, *Comparative Women's Rights and Political Participation in Europe* (Dobb's Ferry, NY: Transnational, 1983).

Joni Lovenduski and Jill Hills, eds. *The Politics of the Second Electorate* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981); Walter S. G. Kohn, *Women in National Legislatures: A Comparative Study in Six Countries* (New York; Praeger, 1980); *Statistical Yearbook* (Paris: UNESCO, 1982); *Yearbook of Labour Statistics* (Geneva: I.L.O., 1982), and Embassies of various countries and the Chicago, IL, Israeli and Japanese consulates.

TABLE 1A  
MOST POWERFUL PREDICTORS OF RECRUITMENT OF WOMEN PARLIAMENT MEMBERS: MULTIPLE STEPWISE REGRESSION 1972\*  
(N = 19)

Independent Variables	Multiple Correlation Coefficient (R)	Cumulative % of Variance Explained (R <sup>2</sup> )	% Variance Explained by Each Variable
Proportional representation system of elections	.48	23	23
Percent women economically active	.62	39	16
Percent women college graduates	.71	50	11
Greater unemployment†	.95	90	40
Late women's suffrage†	.96†	92	2

\* Titles have been changed slightly to conform to Table 1.

† The zero order correlation of this variable is negative.

‡ Significant at less than the .01 level when corrected for degrees of freedom.

Source: Rule 1981.

The latter difference may be accounted for by the more even distribution of unemployment among the 23 countries in 1982. Because of the drop in variance explained by the unemployment variable, the cumulative percent of variance explained (R<sup>2</sup>) on the fourth step of the regression is 76 percent in 1982 as compared with 90 percent in 1972. This also accounts

for the lower final R<sup>2</sup> (82 percent) in the 1982 table. The fifth and sixth step variables are percent rightwing M.P.s and percent of Catholics in countries, both of which are negative predictors for women's parliamentary recruitment.

In the next section we discuss the impact of electoral systems in differing contexts on women's legislative recruitment.

PART II. IMPACT OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS ON WOMEN'S PARLIAMENTARY RECRUITMENT

Table 2 presents the electoral systems of the twenty-three Western-style democracies and the percent of women in the various national legislatures in the 1980-82 period. Glancing down the party-list/PR column one sees that women's parliamentary representation varies from a high of 28 percent in Sweden to a low of 4 percent in Greece, with an average of 12.5 percent. The range in non-party list electoral systems is from 8.8 percent in New Zealand to 0 percent in Australia, both with single-member districts; Japan has a low percentage of women parliamentarians, less than 2 percent, while Ireland had 6.8 percent in 1982. The average percentage of women M.P.s in the non-list countries is about a third (4 percent) of that in the list/PR countries.

TABLE 2  
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS OF 23 WESTERN STYLE DEMOCRACIES AND PERCENT OF WOMEN IN THE NATIONAL LEGISLATURES (Lower Houses, 1982 Period\*)

Party List/Proportional Representation Systems (N = 15)		Non-Party List Systems (N = 8)	
		<i>Single Member District Countries</i>	
Sweden	27.7	New Zealand	8.8
Finland	26.0	Canada	4.3
Norway	23.9	France	4.1
Denmark	22.9	United States	4.1
Netherlands	14.0	United Kingdom	3.1
Switzerland	10.5	Australia	0.0
Austria	9.8	<i>Single Transferable Vote Country</i>	
Portugal	8.8	Ireland	6.8
Italy	8.2	<i>Non-Transferable Vote Country</i>	
Belgium	7.5	Japan	1.6
Israel	7.5		
W. Germany	7.3		
Spain	5.4		
Iceland	5.0		
Greece	4.0		
Party List/PR:		Non-Party List Systems	
Average =	12.5%	Average =	4.1%
Median =	9.3%	Median =	4.1%
Range =	4.0 — 27.7%	Range =	0 — 8.8%

\* Sources are listed in Table 1.

Cases which are low in women's representation but list/PR systems are discussed below, followed by consideration of the effect of the hybrid list/PR/single member district system which obtains in West Germany. The next section contains discussion of the non-list/PR countries' electoral arrangements and their relationship to women's parliamentary recruitment. Explication of the Irish and Japanese systems is followed by consideration of the impact of electoral arrangements in the SMD countries.

#### *Anomalous Cases in Party List/PR Systems*

Why is women's representation in Greece, Iceland, and Spain relatively low compared to other party list/PR countries in 1982? First, the party list system is a favorable factor, but the average district magnitude, five, in Greece, Iceland and Spain is negative. In Greece, the median size district is four — the lowest in Europe's list/PR countries (*General Elections, 18th October, 1981*). Generally, the fewer members of parliament per district, the fewer women are elected, since the percentage of the vote necessary for a parliamentary seat rises as the number of seats decreases. Three-member districts usually require some 25 percent of the vote, while four-member districts require 20 percent and so on. These small districts discourage minority parties from which women might be recruited for M.P. Moreover, where the choices are among a small number of candidates, the stakes are higher for the major parties and it is more difficult for women to obtain party nomination.

However, the electoral arrangements in Greece and Spain are insufficient for explaining the differences between them and Switzerland's much higher percentage of women M.P.s — given about the same district magnitude. Here we see the importance of socioeconomic factors which can meliorate to some degree negative aspects of electoral systems — or which may make an already difficult situation worse. Thus, although Greece and Spain are modernizing (Smela 1983; Commission of the European Communities 1981), there are still low percentages of women in the workforce. Moreover, the ongoing and dominant Roman Catholic and Orthodox religious cultures in these countries reinforce the traditional nonpolitical role of women (Reilly 1985). By contrast, Switzerland has both a Protestant and Catholic religious heritage and a larger percentage of women in the paid workforce who may form an important political base for the election of women M.P.s.

Iceland, like Switzerland, has several favorable socioeconomic factors offsetting its negative district magnitude of six. This low number of representatives per district contributed to a small percentage of women in the parliament, the Althing. However, Iceland also has an electoral feature which proved helpful for increasing women's recruitment in 1983. It is an absence of vote threshold for representation which allows very small parties to have seats in parliament proportionate to the votes they obtain (Agustsson 1986; see also Lijphart 1984: 156). When Iceland's established parties did not place what a women's group considered to be an adequate number of women on their lists for the 1983 election, a women's party (the Women's Alliance) was organized with a list of women's names for presentation to

the voters. Women were then mobilized to vote for women candidates in order to increase their percentages in the Althing (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1984; Biscard 1985).

Iceland's 1983 election resulted in a shift to the left parties, which brought in more women M.P.s, as well as a few representatives from the Women's Alliance (Agustsson 1985). The result was an astonishing increase of women M.P.s from 4 to 15 percent (9 women are in the 60-member Althing). In fine, Iceland's favorable electoral factors — the party list/PR system plus the availability of an electoral rule which allows small party representation — together with propitious political and socioeconomic conditions and the organizing activities of women's groups — overcame a rather unfavorable district magnitude of five persons per district.

#### *How the West Germany Electoral System Discourages Women's Parliamentary Representation*

Half of the seats in West Germany's lower house, the Bundestag, are selected by the list/PR system and the other half are selected in single-member districts on the basis of a plurality vote. Each voter has two votes: one for the individual candidate in the small SMD district and one for the party in the larger PR district. In the PR elections, the proportion of seats in the Bundestag is allocated in proportion to the votes cast for each party (Duverger 1986: 72; Lijphart 1984: 155). The results under this hybrid electoral system are as expected and yet they are quite startling: woman's chances for getting elected in a West German single member district vs. the PR district are about one to four. Thus, for example in 1983, 24 percent of women in the West German Parliament were elected from single-member districts and 76 percent by the list-system PR. In the list/PR "land" districts women M.P.s were 16 percent whereas in the SMD areas only 4 percent of the elected candidates were women (*Handbuch BT 10* [Election Returns for March 6, 1983]).

The moderately high representation of women in the party-list/PR districts is in part a function of the large average number of representatives per district, which is twenty-five (*ibid.*). However, West Germany has a 5 percent vote threshold (Lijphart 1984: 156) for representation which in part offsets the favorable large district magnitude and impacts negatively on women's election in the PR districts. Another negative factor for women in Germany's electoral system is the "spill-over" effect that results when voters vote a single member system ballot and a PR/list ballot. Duverger (1986: 72) explains, "Politically, this combination of the English [single-member district] system and PR exerts a pressure toward a two-party system as a result of the first vote, which influences citizens in how to cast their second vote." Thus the positive aspects of the list/PR system whereby minority parties and women could gain representation in the parliament are in part nullified by combining the two electoral systems.

#### *The Non-Party List Electoral Systems: How They Affect Women's Recruitment to Parliament*

Women comprised 6.8 percent of the Irish parliament in 1980-82 and had increased 30 percent to almost 9 percent by 1984 (Smyth 1984). Ac-

According to Smyth (1984) their representation has been rising quickly since the beginning of the women's movement in the 1970s. The percentage of women M.P.s in 1984 was only slightly less than obtained in West Germany. Although socioeconomic conditions are more favorable in the latter country, the electoral system is a compensating factor in Ireland even though there are only 3-5 representatives per district (Mair 1986). Ireland's single transferable vote (STV) system is a proportional representation system — without the party list. Voters rank individual candidates in order of preference and votes are allocated according to a formula by which excess votes of the first candidate chosen are transferred to voters' second choices and so on (Mair 1986: 290-91; Lijphart and Grofman, 1984: Part IV). Although candidates run as individuals rather than members of a party team, the Irish system still allows representation for persons who receive a minority of votes as do all PR systems. The Irish situation benefits women candidates, since they are more likely to be recruited by party elites than they are in single-member district majority and plurality systems.

*Japan: Why Are There 2 percent Women M.P.s in One House and 8 percent in Another?*

An examination of the two electoral systems for the Japanese Diet provides the answer. Elections for the lower house, the House of Representatives, are held according to a semiproportional electoral system known as the single nontransferable vote (SNTV). Elections for the upper house, the House of Councilors, are held under a straightforward party list/PR system in which party teams compete within districts (Japan Information and Cultural Center 1985). The House of Councilors is the least powerful of the two and may be overruled by the lower house by a two-thirds vote (Hargadine 1981: 303).

For the House of Representatives, voters select only one candidate on the ballot and the individual with the highest number of votes wins (Lijphart, Pintor and Sone 1986b; 154-69). Funding is raised individually for the most part and this is a difficulty for women candidates (Hargadine 1981: 306). Although Japan has three, four and five multimember districts in its lower house, they behave like single-member districts. Theodore McNelly (1984) comments about the single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system of Japan:

Under a different system (e.g., list-system PR with large districts) the smaller parties could probably draw more votes than they do because under the present system they are discouraged from proposing candidates in many of the districts. In that sense they are partially "locked out" of the system to the advantage of the two major parties.

Thus, Japan's SNTV (single nontransferable vote) system for the House discourages the minor parties which make few nominations of women candidates. Since the stakes are high between the two major parties, few women are also nominated by them. Another negative factor for women is the malapportionment in House of Representative districts. In rural districts votes weigh 2.9 times more than those in some urban areas (Taagepera 1984). These rural areas are Liberal Democratic party strongholds (Hargadine

1981: 304), in which few women are likely to be nominated for parliament. In consequence of these various factors, the total percent of women in the House remains about 2 percent.

The situation is much more favorable to women under the party list/PR system which prevails in elections for the upper legislative chamber, the House of Councilors. The effect of the two different systems for which voters express their preferences at the same time, is similar to Germany's hybrid system: women are about four times as plentiful in the list/PR House of Councilors as they are in the House of Representatives. Although the Liberal Democratic party has dominated both houses since 1955, small parties have a greater chance to gain seats in the House of Councilors. Consequently more women are nominated and elected (Hargadine 1981: 305; Japan Information and Cultural Center 1985). While greater women's legislative opportunity in the House of Councilors may be due largely to the party-list /PR system, it is quite possible that the lesser importance of the upper legislative body may also contribute to it.

*Majority and Plurality Single Member District Systems and Women's Legislative Recruitment*

Only six countries among the twenty-three Western-style democracies had the majority or plurality system with single member districts in 1982. They were Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, and France which in 1986 changed to the party list/PR system (*New York Times* 1985: 6). Women in parliament in the SMD countries totaled about 4 percent and the range was from no women representatives to 8.8 percent. Except for New Zealand, the level of women's representation approximates or is less than that in such less modernized countries as Greece and Spain. The primary reason for this is the electoral system rather than inhibiting social, economic, and cultural factors.

In Australia one sees the unfavorable impact of the single-member district system (where  $M = 1$ ) in the House of Representatives, and the favorable result in the multimember district Senate where district magnitude is ten (five are chosen in each election). In 1981 the House was 100 percent male. In 1983 an extensive campaign by Australia's women resulted in six female representatives, or 4.8 percent of the House (Simms 1984) compared to twenty percent of the seats in the Australian Senate (Australian Information Service 1983). The particularly negative feature of the Australian House is a requirement that candidates be elected by an absolute majority of votes. In such cases, women are nominated and elected only in small numbers.

A majority *primary* electoral system (sometimes referred to as the double primary) for the U.S. House of Representatives operates in eight Southern states (Lamis 1984). If no candidate wins a clear majority in the first primary election, another primary is held with the two candidates who received the highest pluralities in the first primary competing in the second. The final election is usually uncontested. By holding second primaries in these still dominant one-party states, the screening process by majority vote effectively all but eliminates women candidates, as well as blacks, while



preserving the status quo for white male Democratic party candidates (*ibid.*; Gertzog Part II, 1984; Rule, 1986).

Turning now to France which also had legislative elections by the majority principle in 1982: France had a double ballot system of elections for parliament which required a parliamentary candidate in each of the single-member districts to obtain a majority vote for election. If no candidate won a majority in the first election, a second was held to obtain a majority vote (Fisichella 1984; Beckwith 1984). Given that the stakes are high — winner takes all — few women were nominated and elected under electoral arrangements of the Fifth Republic. Of late, however, the number had been very slowly increasing — less than 2 percent per election — as a result of affirmative action rules (Mossuz-Lavau and Sine 1981: 119).

The case of France illustrates the effect of changing from the list/PR arrangement to a single-member district/majoritarian system and vice versa. After the French electoral system was altered in 1956 to a single-member system, women's representation was reduced from 3.2 percent to 1.4 percent (Kohn 1980.) However, when elections were held in 1977 for the European Parliament, France adopted a list/PR procedure with one multimember nationwide district. The result was that women were elected to 22 percent of the seats in the French delegation to that Parliament (Commission of the European Communities 1980: 10.) The fact that the European Parliament is a weak legislature with few enforcement powers may account in part for women's high level of representation in this body compared to the French parliament.

Members of the House of Representatives in the U.S. are elected under a system which is theoretically — except for eight Southern states — a plurality system. In practice the system works as a majoritarian one, with a preponderance of two-party or one-party Republican or Democratic areas (Patterson and Caldeira 1984). In a two-party district, voters may usually choose between candidates of the Democratic and Republican parties. In a one-party district voters have no real choice (Lowi 1984).

M.P.s in Great Britain's House of Commons are also elected from single-member districts by a plurality or majority vote. Like the U.S. House, the Commons has a high percentage of incumbents (Welch 1985). Consequently there are few open seats and the probability of greater numbers of women being elected is therefore low (Welch and Studlar 1986). In addition, the total votes gained by parties in all election districts differ markedly from the proportions of seats obtained by each party in the parliament, which also has a negative effect on women's parliamentary representation. These points are illustrated by the 1983 election (Butler 1984: 229). The Liberal Social Democratic Alliance, which had nominated the most women candidates, won twenty-five percent of the popular vote and four percent of the seats in the House of Commons. The Conservative party, which nominated few women candidates, received 42 percent of the popular vote and 61 percent of the seats. In turn, the Labour party's representation in the House of Commons was then disproportionately less by some 20 percent (*ibid.*).

New Zealand is an atypical single-member district country as far as women's legislative representation (8.8 percent) is concerned. Possible rea-

sons for New Zealand's larger representation of women may be, first, incremental building on previous gains; second, the election victory of the Labour party. Of the twelve women elected, ten were Labour nominees (1985 *Air New Zealand Almanac*: 591; also 589-97). This suggests the possibility that New Zealand's Labour party has been more supportive of women candidates than has been the case in England (Hills 1981: 19.) Moreover, women also appear to have a greater role within the trade unions (New Zealand 1984), an important base of the Labour party. Associated with the latter factor is the extraordinarily large percentage of women in the workforce: 55.4 percent — the highest among the twenty-three democracies. This provides a great potential for the political mobilization of women.

Women's considerable parliamentary underrepresentation under the single member district system vs. their representation using other electoral arrangements in the same countries are summarized below in Table 3. It should be borne in mind that except for the West German and Australian cases, the larger percentages were gained in the least powerful legislative bodies.

TABLE 3  
PERCENT WOMEN M.P.s UNDER DIFFERENT ELECTORAL  
ARRANGEMENTS IN THE SAME COUNTRY

West Germany	4%	Women M.P.s in SMD Elections	16% in list/PR Elections
Japan	2%	Women M.P.s in SNTV Elections	8% in list/PR Senate Elections
Australia	5%	Women M.P.s in SMD (absolute majority) Elections	20% in 10-Member Senate Districts Elections**
France	4%	Women M.P.s in SMD (absolute majority) Elections	22% in party list/PR European Parliament Elections

Sources: *Hanbuch BT 10* [Election Returns for March 6, 1983] supplied by the German Information Service, New York City; E. Hargadine, "Japan," in J. Lovenduski and J. Hills, eds., *Women and Public Participation* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), and Japan Information and Cultural Center, personal correspondence, January 25, 1985; *Fact Sheet on Australia, 1983 Election Results*, supplied by Australian Information Service; Commission of the European Communities, "Women in the European Parliament," Supplement #4, *Women of Europe*, Brussels, 1980.

\* Except for West Germany and Australia, the higher percentages are found in the least powerful legislature.

\*\* Half of the senators for each state are chosen in every election.

We turn now to Part III in which the twenty-three democracies are clustered by women's political opportunity for election to parliament.

### PART III. WOMEN'S POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY BY NATIONS

The twenty-three nations were clustered by like characteristics related to women's recruitment to national legislatures. There are three major types — the Political Opportunity Cluster, the Limited Political Opportunity Cluster, and the Mixed Opportunity Clusters (A and B). See Table 5 below.

*The Method Used to Cluster Nations*

The clustering method used was orthogonal factor analysis. The computer routine first isolated three non-overlapping factors explaining a total of 79 percent of the variance (refer to Table 4). These three factors may be interpreted as the three major causes (Rummel 1970: 24-26) of women's parliamentary recruitment, with the amount of variance explained by each factor denoting the relative significance of each on the outcome. Twenty-one percent of the variance is unexplained. In Table 4 below we see highly interrelated variables clustered together. For example, Factor I, named Political Structure Components, is a cluster of all the political variables used in the earlier correlation/regression (Table I) which intercorrelated more with each other than the components in the other factors. Factor loadings, for example .91 and .81 in Factor 1, are interpreted like correlation coefficients and also range from -1.00 through 0 to +1.00 (Kerlinger 1964: 653-54).

TABLE 4  
ANALYSIS OF 23 WESTERN-STYLE NATIONS' POLITICAL, AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC COMPONENTS, AND WOMEN'S RECRUITMENT TO THE NATIONAL LEGISLATURE (Rotated Varimax Orthogonal Factor Analysis)

Factor 1— <i>Political System Components, a Nomination and Election Factor</i>	
Party List/ PR .....	.91
District Magnitude, logged .....	.81
Percent Non-Right M.P.s.....	.72
Percent of women in legislature .....	.41
Variance explained: 31.8%	
Factor 2— <i>Socioeconomic Components, an Eligibility Factor</i>	
Percent Non-Catholic population, logged.....	.79
Percent of women in workforce .....	.74
Percent of women in legislature .....	.77
Percent of unemployed .....	-.63
Variance explained: 29%	
Factor 3— <i>Educational Component, an Eligibility Factor</i>	
Women as percent of college graduates.....	.93
Percent unemployed.....	-.68
Variance Explained: 18.4%	
TOTAL VARIANCE EXPLAINED: 79.2%	
<i>Communalities</i>	
Women in workforce .....	.81
Unemployment .....	.87
Party list, PR .....	.93
Women college graduates .....	.91
Non-Right Members of Parliament.....	.64
Women in legislature.....	.93
District Magnitude, logged .....	.67
Non-Catholics, logged.....	.64
<i>Eigenvalues</i>	
Factor 1 .....	2.54
Factor 2 .....	2.32
Factor 3 .....	1.48

Factor 1, Political Structure Components, explains 31.8 percent of the variance and is of most importance in predicting women's recruitment to the lower houses of parliament. Its major elements are list/proportional representation, a large number of seats per district, and center and left parties — which pertain to the *nomination and election* stages of women's political recruitment to national legislatures.

Factor 2, Socioeconomic Components, accounts for 29 percent of the total variance. Non-Catholic countries are positively associated with higher proportions of women in the workforce and lower unemployment. Women's greater participation in the workforce provides a potential for the political mobilization of women, and it also relates to their informal eligibility for parliament.

Factor 3, Educational Component, accounts for 18 percent of the variance, and it is also significant for the eligibility stage of women's parliamentary recruitment. Unemployment is negatively related to this factor; thus greater proportions of women college graduates is associated with full employment.

To pictorially represent the twenty-three democracies in a two dimensional space, factor scores (Z scores) for Factors 1 and 2 were obtained for each country. The computer then printed the location of each country in the diagram based on their scores on each factor. The same was done for Factors 2 and 3. However, only Factors 1 and 2 are presented in Figure 1 below since there were few differences between the two diagrams.

It should be emphasized that this clustering indicates women's political opportunity, which is a function of the strength of the components in the three factors for each nation as of 1982. Nations can move to the Political Opportunity cluster by the political efforts of women and/or men. For example, in 1971, Austria reduced its districts from twenty-five to nine. This brought the mean number of legislators per district to twenty (Lijphart 1984: 165) a magnitude most favorable to women. Of course, the opposite is also possible, as we have seen by the electoral changes in the Fifth Republic of France.

## DISCUSSION OF NATION CLUSTERS

In Table 5 the nations are clustered according to proximity in the diagram in Figure 2, except for Japan and New Zealand. The latter two formed a separate group (cluster B) which was added to the Mixed Political Opportunity Cluster because of favorable socioeconomic conditions for women's election to parliament.

*Political Opportunity Cluster*

The nations in the Political Opportunity cluster should come as no surprise to the reader. Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden have the most important favorable components for women's nomination and election: greater proportions of center and left parties in the parliament, a party list/proportional representation system, and large district magnitudes. Finland has the highest average number of representatives per district (thir-

FIGURE 2  
23 DEMOCRACIES CLUSTERED BY LIKE POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND PERCENT OF WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT (Z SCORES OF COUNTRIES ON FACTORS 1 AND 2)




TABLE 5  
TWENTY-THREE DEMOCRACIES CLUSTERED BY WOMEN'S POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY FOR RECRUITMENT TO THE NATIONAL LEGISLATURE AS OF 1982 PERIOD (Based on Figure 2 Factor Analysis Diagram)

<i>Political Opportunity</i>		<i>Limited Political Opportunity</i>	
<i>Cluster</i>		<i>Cluster</i>	
(N = 4)		(N = 5)	
Denmark		Australia	
Finland		Canada	
Norway		France	
Sweden		United Kingdom	
		United States	
<i>Mixed Political Opportunity Clusters A &amp; B</i>			
<i>Cluster A (N = 12)</i>		<i>Cluster B (N = 2)</i>	
Austria	Ireland	Japan	
Belgium	Netherlands	New Zealand	
Greece	Portugal		
Iceland	Spain		
Israel	Switzerland		
Italy	West Germany		

teen), Sweden's average district magnitude is twelve, followed by Denmark, ten, and Norway, seven. With strong women's movements, a large group of women who vote for women candidates, and a sizable women's vote, one result in these four countries has been that political parties have been accessible (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1984: 157-58) and quite favorable toward women candidates for parliament. These Nordic countries also have the socioeconomic characteristics which help to make women eligible in practice to be members of the national parliament. In the four Nordic countries there is a high percentage of women in the workforce, a large college-educated group of women, and low unemployment.

*Mixed Political Opportunity Clusters*

Making up the Mixed Political Opportunity Clusters A and B are fourteen countries which have the potential for nominating and electing more women to their national parliaments. Of these Mixed Political Opportunity countries only Israel, West Germany, and Iceland are favorable on the political components (Factor 1) and on the socioeconomic components (Factor 2); hence they have the greatest potential. Since this analysis was made, Iceland has indeed increased considerably its proportion of women M.P.s. Women's representation in Israel's parliament is, however, increasing slowly, since a large proportion in its parliament is rightwing and the rightwing parties nominate few women for the Knesset. West Germany's prospects for women M.P.s are limited by the single-member district/party list/PR hybrid electoral system discussed in the preceding pages.

All the remaining countries are favorable only on Factor 1, the political components, but are unfavorable on Factor 2, the socioeconomic conditions. The average magnitude of electoral constituencies varies from a low of four in Greece to a high of one hundred fifty in the Netherlands where the nation is the electoral district. That country has the highest percentage of women in the parliament in the non-Nordic countries, whereas Greece has the lowest. The remainder are somewhere in between these extremes.

In the Mixed Opportunity Countries, several have higher proportions of leftwing and center party members in parliament and so have increased their percentages of women beyond what might be expected in countries where few representatives are elected per district. This group includes Belgium, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, and Portugal. Contrariwise, Austria and Portugal, in addition to Israel, have greater proportions of conservative M.P.s. Increasing slowly now, the proportion of women in these parliaments should improve considerably should there be a change to greater left and center party strength.

Eleven of these Mixed Political Opportunity countries have at least one below-average eligibility factor such as a low percentage of women in the workforce. Having a large percentage of women in the workforce and/or college graduates, for example, is beneficial but not an absolute necessity for increased women's parliamentary recruitment. This is because a smaller pool of potential candidates is sufficient for the limited number of seats in parliament.

The remaining two Mixed Political Opportunity countries (Cluster B) are Japan and New Zealand. They are both high on socioeconomic conditions, Factor 2, but low on the political structural components, Factor 1. Previously we have seen how Japan with a semi-PR system and multimember districts nevertheless behaves like a SMD country with a two-party dominant system and rural-skewed districts. In consequence, it has few women M.P.s in its lower house. New Zealand, on the other hand, is a single-member district system but remains somewhat of an enigma with its women's parliamentary delegation at least double that of other SMD countries. There are system specific factors operating there which need to be researched further.

Australia, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States made up the Limited Political Opportunity Cluster as of 1982. These countries are higher than average in unemployment. But the remainder of the socioeconomic components are favorable. There are high percentages of women in the workforce as well as in the college educated group. There are more than enough women to make a significant pool of potential candidates. However, the recruitment pool is not the major obstacle to increased legislative recruitment opportunity for women in the Limited Opportunity Countries cluster. The single member district system, with its scarce open seats, is.

#### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Part I concerned the most significant predictors of women's parliamentary recruitment in the 1982 period compared to a decade earlier. Type of electoral system is still the most significant predictor. Specifically, the party list/proportional representation system provides the most political opportunity for women. Part II included a discussion of the impact of various electoral systems and contextual factors in different countries. Part III corroborated the earlier findings and showed how they fell into three groupings: the political structural components, which included district magnitude; the socioeconomic components and religious heritage, extent of women in the workforce, and unemployment; and thirdly, the educational component, percent of women college graduates. Finally, countries were clustered by like characteristics varying from the Political Opportunity countries to those providing Limited Political Opportunity.

The data presented in this paper make a convincing case for the superiority of party list/PR systems — in particular those with large district magnitudes — for women's opportunity for election to parliament. Even those countries with small numbers of representatives per district (three-six members) generally average higher proportions of women parliamentarians than do the single-member district countries. The chances are that the parliamentary election of women in these most unfavorable of list-PR countries will nevertheless increase faster in the future than the SMD countries.

This analysis also has shown that women's political activity is very important for increasing women's recruitment in parliament in various elec-

toral systems. Negative electoral system features have been overcome by women's political mobilization. Positive/affirmative action by parties may promote women's nomination. In addition, electoral laws may be changed to allow greater women's political opportunity. Small districts may be combined into larger ones. Moreover, legislative terms may be limited to allow for greater turnover and more open seats. Absent such developments, we may expect that women in most SMD states will not reach parliamentary parity with men in their lifetimes, whereas the opposite is the prognosis for women in party list/PR and other multimember district countries.

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THE COGNITIVE UTILIT

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al.

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THE DOMINANT concept in the study of partisanship, especially its operationalization by the Center/Center for Political Studies as party identification, has had its strong impact on behavior, perceptions of the political attitudes, partisanship has been the subject of inquiry. It has been empirically examined and theoretically analyzed as a dependent variable<sup>1</sup> and as an independent variable.<sup>2</sup> Other research has concentrated on a thorough treatment of the problems surrounding the conceptualization and measurement of party identification.<sup>3</sup>

As originally formulated by the authors of *The American Voter* (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1960), party identification is a psychological concept, serving psychological functions. These functions would include the reinforcement of vote choices, and perceptual screening of political actors and events. But one school of research has attempted to describe and analyze the political content and functions of party identification, by focusing on the policy bases of partisanship.<sup>4</sup> This approach is useful

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<sup>1</sup>The literature regarding the origins and determinants of party identification is a broad one, encompassing a variety of themes. A representative sampling of this literature includes Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960: 146-57); Converse (1969); Jennings and Niemi (1974, 1981); Abramson (1979); Erikson, Luttbeg and Tedin (1980); Hill and Luttbeg (1983); and, Jennings and Markus (1984).

<sup>2</sup>Summaries of the impact of party identification on behavior and other political attitudes, as well as on perceptions of other political phenomena, can be found in Campbell, et al. (1960: 128-42); and Hill and Luttbeg (1983).

<sup>3</sup>The literature which incorporates conceptual and/or operational analyses of party identification includes Petrocik (1974); Maggiotto and Pierson (1977); Weisberg (1980); and Jacoby (1982).

<sup>4</sup>One of the first attempts to explore the political content and/or functions of partisanship was by Downs (1957). Other notable contributions to this literature are made by Natchez (1970); Pomper (1972); Jackson (1975); Meier (1975); Fiorina (1977); and Franklin and Jackson (1983).

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Measuring Party Identification. First, in an issue on that scale. We do not know the issue's response from the wish to lower the vote prox-

may why, nt-