Journal Citation:
35 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL, 219-254 (1985).
This theoretical article discusses the domestic enforcement of international
human rights and the theoretical footings of their legal authority. The author
distinguishes between international conventions that represent a fusion of
national interests and so require transformation to become domestically
effective, and those that embody principles of practical reason already
incorporated in the general will. He argues that the transformationist doctrine is
applicable only to covenants that are products of executive discretion. A
number of treaties have been concluded whose object is a transcendent
common good of the human community. The transformationist doctrine has no
logical relevance to these covenants as they do not pose a significant threat to
sovereignty. He distinguishes between international human rights rules and
principles. Human rights principles do not require confirmation by legislatures
and may be properly considered not only in interpreting constitutional
guarantees of human rights, but also as guides to the elaboration of the common
law and as constraints to the operation of rules of decision. [The focus of this
article is not specifically women's rights.]